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This thesis examines current and future trends in
U. S . -Japanese defense burden- sharing . To understand the
current state of Japanese defense policy, a broad historical
survey is provided. This is followed by an examination of
key world "players" views on increasing Japan's defense
expenditures to meet the challenges of the future. Finally,
various views on the likely direction Japan should follow in
terms of its security relationship with the United States
are provided from a Japanese and American perspective.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Japanese surrender onboard the battleship U.S.S.
Missouri marked the end of World War II and signified the
defeat of Imperial Japan. It was a time of national humili-
ation, a time to (as" the emperor said) "bear the unbea-
rable". 1 Japan's military-industrial capability was
dismantled by U.S. Occupation Forces and a process of reedu-
cation was underway. The U. S . -inspired 1947 Constitution
had specific provisions which would limit Japan's war-making
ability. As of 1985 the Japanese rank eigth in world
defense expenditures, with a modern army, air force and
navy; yet the U.S. is constantly pressuring the Japanese to
re-arm, seemingly in contradiction to prior U.S. policy. 2
This study will explore this unusual situation, in an
effort to understand why policy has changed in the United
States and Japan over the years.
To do this I will first examine the evolution of Japanese
defense policy, divided into two parts. First, the period
of 1945 to 1973, then 1973 to the present. The year 1973 is
a convenient point in time to separate these two 'phases' in
the evolution of Japanese defense policy, but it by no means
represents a sudden change; rather it marks a time of
gradual changes on the horizon. This evolutionary process
will be described and explained in the course of this study.
Next, I will explore an important facet of U.S. -Japan
defense relations, that is, the nature of the primary threat
to Japan - namely, the Soviet Union. If certain events in
^ukioh Satoh, The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy
Adelphi Paper No. T7S(Dorking, Great Britain: Bartholomew
Press, 1982) p. 1.
2 James H. Buck, Japan's Defense Policy, Armed Forces andSociety
, 8(Fall 1981): p. 79.
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recent years (such as the Soviet attack on KAL 007, the
Vietnamese war in Kampuchea, etc.), coupled with a massive
Soviet buildup of its forces concurrent with a relative U.S.
decline had not occurred, it is doubtful that Japanese
public opinion could have changed as it has in recent times.
Accordingly, we will demonstrate the extent and' nature of
the Soviet threat in two parts. First, a nuts-and-bolts
examination of the growth of Soviet military power in the
region, compared to western forces. Second, an examination
of Soviet - Japanese relations, focusing on Soviet views of
Japanese rearmament as found in Soviet and Japanese
writings
.
Having provided the basis for further analysis, the
focus will shift to an in-depth presentation on the various
schools of thought in Japan today on defense. It will cover
the gamut of viewpoints, from the far left to the far right,
with explanations by American and Japanese scholars. In a
recent conversation with Lt.Col. Yoshihisa Nakamura of the
Japanese National Defense Academy, Department of Defense
Studies, I was introduced to the> ideas of a number of
Japanese scholars, politicians, etc. who would be regarded
as representing these various schools of thought. 3 Some of
these individual's writings will be analyzed.
Before examining the prospects for increased Japanese
burden- sharing from the U.S. perspective, we shall examine
some key players' views on this topic, for purposes of
political comparison with Washington's views and policies,
so we might place this issue in a broader perspective.
Although very much a U.S. - Japan issue; increased military
spending by Japan would have far-reaching implications for
the world at large and especially for Asia.
Conversation with Lt.Col. Yoshihisa Nakamura of the
Japanese National Defense Academy, Department of Defense
Studies, at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
on 19 January 1985.
In trying to narrow down this endeavor, the analysis
which follows will be limited to the following nations/
regions: 1) Western Europe, 2) the People's Republic of
China, 3) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
,
4) the Korean Peninsula (including both North and South),
and ANZUS . These represent the crucial actors 'or players
which will influence, to varying degrees, the extent that
Japan will move toward" increased burden- sharing (if at all).
The specific reasons for examining the above actors will be
discussed at length in their applicable sections of this
study. Suffice it to say at this point that certain common
threads can be identified which run through their respective
foreign policies in terms of Japanese rearmament . We shall
explore these attitudes, and reservations, if any.
The next and concluding section will be a summary of
American security interests in the region with regard to
Japan increasing its share of the responsibilities. The
Reagan administration has emphasized its desire for Japan to
fulfill specific missions as a tactic for increased Japanese
involvement in defense burden- sharing . Its viability will
be discussed.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY
A. 1945 TO 1973
As mentioned in the introduction, the year 1945 left an
embittered Japanese public. A strong public aversion to the
war and to the militarism of the 1930s and early 1940s
explains much of Japan's reluctance to pursue any semblance
of rearmament in this period.
Unlike Nazi Germany, Japan in the pre-war period was
under the domination of a military faction vice a philosoph-
ical social force. In other words, the Japanese military,
led by Tojo, operated independently of the workings of the
Japanese government. Unlike Nazi Germany, the militarism
displayed by the generals in the Imperial Japanese Army did
not have a close equivalent in the civilian government of
Japan. It is understandable in light of the military's
control of Japan that many Japanese equated the military
with anti-democracy.'* Any rise in military strength could
risk a potential loss in human rights, democracy, etc. of
the sort which was experienced prior to World War II. This
anti-military sentiment persists today, and remains an
obstacle to increasing Japan's defense budget. 5 With this in
mind, let us review the historical circumstances since WWII.
The U.S. Occupation Forces, headed by Gen. Douglas
MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers occupying
Japan, imposed a U . S .- inspired constitution upon Japan in




l(March 1982): pp . 29-32
5 Weinstein, "Japan's Defense Policy and the
May 1 Journal of Northeast Asian Studies
Aspiring sincerely to an International peace based onjustice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right or the nation and the threat or
use of force as a means of settling international
disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well
as other war potential, will never be maintained.




This constitution was generally acceptable to the Japanese,
who were weary of war and resigned (for the time being) to
the U.S. presence in Japan.
The Korean War was the first of many incidents which
began to influence the direction Japan would follow in the
years ahead. In response to the U.S. involvement in Korea,
Gen. MacArthur pressured Japan into establishing a 75,000
man para-military National Police Reserve(NPR) in July 1950.
Prime Minister Ashida interpreted Article 9 of the constitu-
tion as not denying the formation of a self-defense force,
thereafter known as the "Ashida- Kiyose Interpretation".
The Ashida-Kiyose Interpretation allowed for a greater
acceptance of the para-military force being instituted in
Japan. 7
As the Korean War dragged on, U.S. attention to Japanese
defense increased. In 1951 in San Francisco, California,
the Japan - U.S. Security Treaty was signed. Then in 1952
(much earlier than many anticipated) Japan was granted inde-
pendence by the United States. Japan was pressured into
improving the NPR; in its place a 110,000-man National
Safety Force was established with a sea component. In 1954
this force was modified once again, becoming a tri-service
Self-Defense Force (SDF) which remains in Japan today. 8
s Buck, p. 79.
7 Satoh, p. 2.
8 Ibid, p. 3.
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During these early years, the role of the SDF was poorly
defined, yet a basic defense doctrine was developed; known
as the 'Yoshida Strategy'. This strategy, as enunciated by
Prime Minister Yoshida following talks with Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles, hinged upon Japan's willingness to
allow U.S. forces to utilize bases in Japan in return for
U.S. security protection should an aggressor attack Japan. 9
This strategy continues to be the mainstay of Japanese
defense planning. 10 However, recent events have led many to
consider new options.
In May 1957 Japan adopted the 'Basic Policy for National
Defense' which relied on the Japan-U.S. alliance as the
major (if not the sole) shield against the spectre of
external attack. This policy provided the basis for a
series of four 5-year "Buildup Plans" which were carried out
from 1958 to 1976. Each of these "Buildup Plans" doubled in
real terms the size of the Japanese defense budget, although
considering the growth of the Japanese economy this actually
meant a smaller percentage of GNP as time went on. l 1
1960 was an important year, for it was the year which
saw a renegotiation of the security treaty. The Japan-U.S.
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (MST) was rammed
down the throats of the opposition in the Japanese Diet by
Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi. Although provoking mass
demonstrations from the left, the treaty survived; ironi-
cally this caused the socialists to split into two parties
9 Ibid, p. 3.
1
°Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan's Search for Strategy",
International Security
8(Winter 1983/84): 155-161.
lx Satoh, p. 4.
12 Ibid, p. 4.
11
resulting in a strengthening of the dominant LDP! 12 The
major aspect of the MST was Article 5, which stated:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack against
either party in the territories under the administration
of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety
and declares that it would act to meet the common danger




As the 1960s continued, Japan accelerated its rapid
economic expansion, but with no commensurate defense
buildup. In 1967 Prime Minister Sato enunciated the "Three
Non-Nuclear Principles" which became another continuing
aspect of Japanese defense policy. These three principles,
simply put, are 1) no possession of nuclear weapons, 2) no
production of nuclear weapons, and 3) no entry of nuclear
weapons into Japan. Since Sato's pronouncement, these prin-
ciples have been repeatedly stressed in unanimous Diet
resolutions x *
Also in 1967 a resolution was passed to limit arms
exports, restraining Japan from sales to socialist nations,
nations at war, etc. This resolution was modified in 1976
to preclude the sale of arms anywhere. 15 Finally, in 1972
Okinawa was returned to Japan by the United States. It is
the return of Okinawa which many Japanese use to mark the
arbitrary end of the postwar period, and is a useful event
to cite as the end of the first phase 15 However, it was the
Arab Oil Embargo in 1973 and the resultant shock between the
U.S. and Japan which clearly marked an end of one phase and
the beginning of another.
13 Buck, p. 81




When looking back over the period 1945-1973, we can make
some generalities. First, through the Yoshida Strategy,
Japan was able to relegate defense matters to the lowest
possible priority, with very little attention given to
strategy. What little discussion existed during this period
was of a legal vice a strategic nature. As Japan grew
economically, it sought to use diplomacy as the primary tool
for regaining lost Japanese prestige resulting from its WWII
defeat. Through U.S. auspices, Japan regained acceptance
into the international community; signalled by entrance into
the IMF in 1952, GATT in 1955 and the United Nations in
1956.
Japan restored diplomatic relations with two important
nations in this period. First, the USSR, Japan's enemy for
many years, in 1956. Then, South Korea, a nation whose
people had been at odds with Japan's for a long time, in
1965. Japanese hatred toward these nations had to be over-
come in the process of normalization with these countries
.
These points, will be explored in greater detail later in
this study.
By the late 1960s Japan was moving toward a trade
surplus with the United States; thus giving rise in the U.S.
Congress to the notion of a "free-ride" by Japan at the
expense of the United States. 17 Meanwhile, the use of bases
in Okinawa by the U.S. in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts
caused some in Japan to wonder if the MST threatened Japan
more than it protected it. 18 Until 1973, one can generalize
about Japanese defense policy as being a reflection of what
the United States deemed appropriate for Japan. As the
1970s continued, we can observe an increasing tendency in
Tokyo to formulate Japan's policy more independently from
17 Murray Sayle. "The Yellow Peril and the Red Haired
Devils", Harpers (November 1982): p. 34.
18 Ibid, p. 35.
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the United States. It is in this context that we turn to
the next phase of Japanese defense policy formulation.
B. 1973 TO PRESENT
The 1970s and 1980s have witnessed the continued rapid
economic growth of Japan amidst a changing global balance of
power. The basic tenet of the Yoshida Strategy is that an
attack against Japan "would lead to a direct confrontation
with the enormous military potential of the U.S., resulting
in substantial sacrifice, a consequence which actively
deters aggression against Japan." 19 However, events in Asia
and the world, to be examined shortly, have forced many
Japanese to recognize that 1) U.S. power is declining rela-
tive to the Soviet Union's, and 2) the massive Soviet
buildup, particularly in the Pacific, is bent upon a course
of favorable 'correlation of forces', which places Japan in
an increasingly vulnerable position vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union. 20
The textile controversy of 1971 (Nixon's non-negotiated
quota on Japanese textiles), coupled with a more protec-
tionist economic policy of the U.S. in the early 1970s led
many Japanese to realize that the United States and Japan
were losing the status of "economic partners" to be replaced
by "economic rivals". 21 The "Nixon Shocks" ( shokku ) caused
by U.S. rapproachment with China (as well as the soybean
controversy) was viewed by many Japanese as a betrayal by
the U.S.; a sign of a certain lack of faith in Japan. 22 The
1973 Oil Crisis demonstrated to Japan that in times of
crisis the United States could not necessarily be relied
19 Buck, p. 83.
20 Ibid, p. 84.
21 Sayle, p. 35
22 Ibid
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upon to ensure adequate supplies of oil. Also the extreme
dependence of Japan on raw materials in general was made
obvious
.
In 1975 the fall of Saigon following the U.S. troop
withdrawal from Vietnam signalled both a much decreased U.S.
presence in Asia, and the perception among Asians of a
declining will in the United States to meet its security
requirements and commitments. 23 Concurrently, the Soviet
Union began to expand its presence in the Asia-Pacific
region, especially with regard to naval activites near
Japan. 2 u
The proposal by U.S presidential candidate Jimmy Carter
to reduce the number of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea
tended to further inflame Japanese skepticism over the U.S.
commitment to Japan. After becoming president, Carter
dispatched Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
Philip Habib to meet with President Park and Prime Minister
Fukuda to express U.S. views in this matter. The Japanese
used this as an opportunity to protest the U.S. troop reduc-
tion, contending that the ground forces could not be with-
drawn without creating considerable danger to the security
of South Korea and Northeast Asia in general. 25
This proposal, unilateral in design, seemed particularly
suspect given the poor state of affairs which had developed
between the United States and the ROK as a result of the
23 Satoh, p. 10
2
*Ibid, p. 5.
25 0nkar Marwah and Jonathon D. Pollack, eds
.
, Military
Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India and Japan
(BoulderT Co.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 149, 150. "
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"Koreagate" scandal, human rights violations, etc.
Ultimately, Carter backed off on this proposal, but not
without once again tarnishing the image of American resolve
(or the lack thereof) in the minds of many Japanese. 26
The overthrow of the Shah of Iran during the Iranian
Revolution and the ensuing hostage crisis saw an embarrassed
U.S. send the Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean as it became
stretched thinner than ever before so as to meet global
security needs. Then a series of events transpired,
unnerving to the Japanese.
In 1978 the Vietnamese invaded Kampuchea. In January
1979 the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the
P.R.C. as it abrogated the U.S. -Taiwan Defense Pact; once
again raising doubts over U.S. commitments to its allies.
February 1979 saw the Chinese attack Vietnam, heightening
tensions in Southeast Asia. In 1979 the world and Japan
witnessed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Meanwhile,
Vietnamese naval and air bases had been occupied by Soviet
forces
.
The Soviet and Vietnamese activity raised concerns in
Japan over the well-being of the ASEAN states. The KAL -
007 disaster on 1 September 1983 resulted in the death of
269 lives, including 28 Japanese citizens. Upon first
hearing of the possibility of KAL-007 being shot down, the
Japanese were slow to react to the incident. 27 But by the
third of September (with the Japanese on 24-hour maritime
patrol for any signs of debris from the ill-fated flight)
the nature of the incident had become more clear to the
Japanese government; harsh official statements began to be
issued in protest . Chief Cabinet Minister Masaharu Gotoda
said it was "unpardonable to shoot down civilian
26 Ibid, p. 151
27
"Tokyo reacts with Caution" New York Times (2 Sep.
1983): p. 4.
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aircraft". 28 On the 4th of September grieving Korean and
Japanese relatives tossed chrysanthemums into the waters




The overall effect of these incidents has been one of
switching the brunt of the security debate from'whether or
not to maintain Japan-U.S. security arrangements and the
constitutionality of the SDF to more practical, realistic
questions, i.e., the speed of modernization, the desired
mode of cooperation with the United states, etc., taking the
previously mentioned questions of debate for granted. For
example, the Second Mid-Term Program Estimate for the
1983-1987 period was approved in April 1981 by the cabinet-
level National Defense Council chaired by Prime Minister
Suzuki. 30 This estimate established specific and realistic
goals for the SDF to meet in terms of military growth, and
will directly determine Japan's ability to maintain its
commitment to sea-lane defense. 31
Two developments have evolved independently of one
another during the 1970s: as the Soviet Union has increased
in power relative to the United States, Japan has grown
immensely in economic power. This has brought a great deal
of pressure by the West in general and the U.S. in partic-
ular for Japan to increase its defense expenditures. This
is not unreasonable, given the recent chain of world
events(the Soviet military buildup in the Far East, the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese invasion of
2
"Clyde Haberman "U.S. and Japanese Find no Trace of
Korean Plane" New York Times (3 Sep. 1983): p. 16
29 Clyde Haberman "With Flowers and Cries of Grief,
Japanese Honor those who Died" New York Times (5 Sep. 1983):
p . 19 .
3
"Larry K. Niksch "Japanese Defence Policy: Reaching a
New Plateau" Pacific Defence Reporter (Feb. 1983): p. 35.
31 Ibid
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Kampuchea, the KAL-007 shooting, etc.). It should be noted
that as time goes by, a higher percentage of Japanese will
have been born since 1945, resulting in a Japanese Diet
being primarily comprised of individuals of the postwar
generation. With more Japanese politicians born since WWII,
defense discussions are not the taboo subjects * they once
were; the indirect result may be a more visible and accepted
SDF.
In 1976 Japan's fourth 5-year "Buildup Plan" was
completed and a new program evolved. It was called the
National Defense Program Outline and was adopted with a view
of enhancing Japan's air defense and anti-submarine capabil-
ities. It is a new approach to defense planning; it
includes a "Mid-Term Program Estimate" covering a 5-year
period which is reviewed annually. In 1978 joint Japan-U.S.
studies were initiated to seek ways of improving military
cooperation.
The late 1970s saw increased Japanese economic assis-
tance to troubled economies such as Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan
and Thailand; aimed at enhancing- Japanese prestige and
increasing stability in the target nations. This was fully
in accord with the well known Japanese policy of economic
diplomacy ( seikei bunri or separating economics from poli-
tics). This policy of seikei bunri evolved in the 1960s as
an effort by Japan to pursue trade with nations regardless
of their political bent. This could enable Japan to simul-
taneously trade with the nations of Eastern Europe and pay
political "lip-service" to official U.S. policy toward those
nations. In this way, Japan began to expand its relations




Barnett Beyond War : Japan' s Concept of
National Security (Washington, ^TJ.C:
's, 1954), pp. ix-xv, 1-6.
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However, as the 1970s continued, the concept of economic
diplomacy became an increasingly inappropriate foreign
policy for Japan to follow. The realities of a less
powerful United States economically vis-a-vis Western Europe
and Japan, and militarily vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, led
Prime Minister Ohira in April 1979 to order a task force on
Comprehensive National Security. This task force was headed
by Dr. Masamichi Inoki , former head of the Japan Defense
Academy. Dr. Inoki completed the study and made recommenda-
tions to Prime Minister Ito in July 1980, following the
death of Prime Minister Ohira 33 Unlike economic diplomacy,
comprehensive security combines defense and diplomacy
(diplomacy which has an economic aspect to it) in such a
manner as to effect maximum political stability in those
nations which Japan has targeted for aid. Both economic
diplomacy and comprehensive security can trace their roots
to the "Yoshida Doctrine", attributed to Prime Minister
Shigeru Yoshida in the early post-war years
.
3 u This strategy
relied upon the United States to provide for Japan's
national security, freeing Japan to- pursue a rapid economic
recovery and expansion over the years. Active trading with
any and all nations (seikei bunri), the U.S. permitting,
became the device for Japan to pursue its own unique foreign
policy independent from that of the United States.
The notion of comprehensive security, strongly advocated
by the late Prime Minister Ohira, is still very much in
effect as a Japanese principle of foreign policy. 35 It
reflects an increased awareness by many Japanese of the new
33 Ibid
3I
*Nishihara Masashi "How Much Longer the Fruits of the
Yoshida Doctrine" Journal of Asiatic Studies 22(1979): pp.
78, 79. 7 —
35 Gerald L. Curtis"Japan and the United States: Alliance
Politics in the Eighties" Trialogue (Summer/Fall 1981): p.
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realities Japan must face in a world which can no longer
rely on the balance of power to be maintained by the United
States single-handedly. As Nobuhiko Ushiba explains it:
In helping developing countries strengthen their resili-
ence to such corrosive forces, foreign assistance,
access to markets, foreign investments, technical coop-
eration, assistance in strengthening administrative
institutions, and a variety of other forms of non-
military cooperation may be much more effective than
military aid or commitments. The Japanese concept of
"comprehensive security" is designed to draw attention
to the importance of the non-military as well as the
military aspects of free world security. 36
In an effort to appear cooperative with the West in
general and the United States in particular, Japan joined in
international sanctions against the Soviet Union in response
to the Afghan invasion; Japan also joined in the U.S. -led
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic games. It must be
noted that these actions were largely symbolic in nature and
did not entail great risk nor sacrifice. When the U.S. asked
for Japanese cooperation in its sanctions againstlran, Tokyo
moved much slower. 37 In 1980 the Japanese Diet established
Special Committees on National Security, reflective of a
gradual change of perception amongst Japanese politicians. 38
This period also saw the gradual acceptance by opposition
parties of all or part of the present Japan-U.S. security
arrangements. This should not necessarily be construed to
mean a major shift in the party platforms so much as indi-
vidual strategies by the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP),
Japan Socialist Party (JSP) to achieve various objectives,
such as preventing the changing of the "Peace Constitution",
but the fact that some shift has occurred is worthy of
3S Nobuhiko Ushiba "Exploring Japan's International Role"
Trialogue (Summer/Fall 1981): p. 4.
37 Miguel Wionczek "Power Plays in Asia" The Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists (March 1983): p. 13.
38 Satoh, p. 37.
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mention. The DSP came out in support of the SDF in the late
1970s, with the Komeito Party expressing support in 1981.
Even the JSP, long-time advocates of an 'unarmed neutralist'
policy, softened their rhetoric. Only the Japanese
Communist Party (JCP) remains rigidly opposed to the current




With Prime Minister Suzuki agreeing to some forms of
Japanese sea-lane defense out to 1,000 nautical miles
followed by the election of the even more pro-U.S. Nakasone;
things appear brighter than ever before in terms of the
prospects for burden- sharing. k ° Certain events in Japanese
domestic politics in the last few years have also served to
contribute toward or indicate an increased acceptance of
global realities by the Japanese public.
First, on January 18, 1980 retired SDF Major General
Yukihisa Miyanaga was arrested on espionage charges for
passing military secrets to a Soviet agent. The small
penalty for such a crime in Japan (maximum one year in jail
and $150.00 fine) means that Japan cannot help but be
perceived as being unreliable by its western "allies"
regarding the exchange of state secrets , due to the inade-
quacy of Japan's espionage laws. The Diet debated the issue
but dropped it as it has in the past. 1* 1 It should be
mentioned here that in spite of these shortcomings, the
United States does maintain several significant security
arrangements with Japan. 1* 2
39 Ibid, p. 6.
"°Weinstein, p. 24
a iu Taketsugu Tsurutani "Japan's Defense Responsibilities,
and Capabilities", Orbis (Spring 1981): p. 102.
" 2 Buck, p. 89.
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Another incident goes back to October 1979, when the
secret enshrinement of fourteen Japanese war criminals
(including Prime Minister Tojo) took place at the Yasukuni
Shrine in Tokyo. Although State Shinto was abolished
following the end of WWII, Prime Minister Ohira visited the
shrine amidst protests from pacifists, Christians, etc.,
when the news was released six months later." 3
A less abstract incident occurred in June 1978, when SDF
Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, General Hiroomi Kurisu,
was fired for publicly expressing his dismay over what he
viewed as an ill-prepared SDF in light of Soviet exercises
north of Hokkaido. General Kurisu believed that in the
event of a Soviet invasion, the SDF might be forced to act
outside of the legal constitutional framework in order to
repel an attack. His frankness got him fired, but it also
increased the debate over whether or not the Japanese Prime
Minister is capable of acting decisively on behalf of his
country in times of national emergency. Kurisu put the
spotlight on then existing laws that dealt with the SDF and
in so doing made defense issues more acceptable as matters
deserving of public attention. Kurisu' s efforts paid off;
one and a half years later the Japanese Diet ruled that the
prime minister can act temporarily outside of legal
constrictions in the event of a national emergency . * k
Another important issue still under discussion in 1985
became controversial in June 1980, when Justice Minister
Seisuke Okuno addressed the Lower House Judicial Affairs
Committee on the subject of constitutional revision. Okuno
suggested that there is no broad political consensus
regarding the constitution, particularly regarding Article
9. For his remarks he was labeled a conservative
* 3 Ibid, p. 90
* u Ibid, p. 90
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reactionary; yet it most certainly caused many Japanese to
reassess their opinions on constitutional reform. 45
By 1982, the Japanese had engaged in several RIMPAC
joint exercises with U.S. and allied forces, signalling a
break from prior policy.'' 5 The increased profile of the
Maritime Self -Defense Force (MSDF) goes back to 1980, when
the Japanese government decided that self-defense included
defense of Japanese shipping as well as Japanese territory.
This modified the prior principle that the MSDF could only
conduct defensive operations when Japan was being directly
threatened. k 7
Finally, no discussion of contemporary defense-related
issues would be complete without mentioning the ever-present
Northern Territories problem (this will be examined further
in the USSR section) . Continued Soviet control over these
islands is a knife in the back of Japanese pride and an
obstacle to improved Japanese- Soviet relations. With Soviet
aggrandizement gaining increased notoriety recently (Poland,
Afghanistan, etc.) the Soviet buildup in the Kuriles can
prove to be a useful issue which Americans should raise in
arguing for increased pragmatism amongst the Japanese people
and government, with the goal of more equitable defense
burden- sharing
.
Having discussed some aspects of the development of
Japanese defense policy, and in light of the Northern
Territories problem, let us now turn our attention to the
primary threat: the Soviet Union.
1,5 Ibid, p. 91.
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"SDF Could Legally Protect Sealan , Ships if Capable
Suzuki", Japan Times (II Nov. 1980): ]
III. THE SOVIET THREAT TO JAPAN
A. SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN THE PACIFIC
Benjamin F. Schemmer, in an article written for Armed
Forces International summed up the military situation in the
Pacific as it has developed over the past few years when he
said:
The Pacific theatre has been something of a forgotten
stepchild since America withdrew from Vietnam and Pentagon
planners turned their attention back on Europe. As in World
War II, Europe again enjoyed first priority. Former Defense
Secretary Harold Brown appointed a Special Advisor for NATO
Affairs, with no counterpart for the Pacific, while
President Carter came close to withdrawing most American
f
round forces from Korea. The western Pacific receded
urther from American consciousness as the Iranian crisis of
1979 unfolded, as Russia invaded Afghanistan, and as the
Pentagon's focus shifted to the Persian Gulf. Not only did
America's global strategy hinge on a 'swing strategy' that
would withdraw down resources from the Pacific, if neces-
sary, to defend Europe first, but most of the Navy and
Marine Corps assets put into the Rapid Deployment Force for
Southwest Asia were taken from US forces in the Pacific. 48
If Schemmer' s point is valid, this would seem to be
strong reason for Japan to awaken to the dangers which a
shift in the global power balance would mean for the future
of Japanese security. Accordingly, for a breakdown of
current Soviet force levels (approximate) compared to
Japan's, 1* 9 refer to Figure 1.
Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union has increased its
naval strength in the Pacific by 80% with a constant (at
^Benjamin F. Schemmer, "The Pacific Naval Balance",
Armed Forces Journal International (April 1984): p. 34.
49 James T. Westwood, "Japan and Soviet Power in the
Pacific". Strategic Review
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Figure 1 Orders of Battle : Japan-USSR' s Far East Forces
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best) U.S. naval presence. The Soviets have increased their
number of surface combatants from fifty to about ninety 50
The Soviet Pacific fleet has grown from the smallest to the
largest of their four fleets, with approximately 800 naval
and naval support ships total, representing about 40% of the
entire Soviet fleet; including 27% of Soviet Naval Aircraft,
31% of all combatants and 30% of naval manpower. Surely
this indicates the high priority which the Soviets have
attached to the Asia-Pacific region. 51
According to Adm. Sylvester R. Foley, Jr., U.S.N. , the
quality, like quantity, of the Soviet Pacific fleet has
undergone much change as well: "Russia's Pacific Fleet used
to have the leftovers, the cast-offs from the other fleets,
whereas today the fleet has the most modern of ships and the
latest equipment. 52 He goes on to say "...their exercises
integrate the Soviet air arm with naval activities to a much
greater degree than they've ever done in the past with much
more sophisticated exercises. 53 To compare current levels of
U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the Pacific, 5£t refer to
Figure 2.
In air forces, the Soviets have added 600 fighters and
350 bombers for a total of 1,700 aircraft, a formidable
force. Soviet naval aircraft number approximately 400, a
50% increase since 1969. Schemmer calculates that if all
the aircraft in Japan plus all naval and marine aircraft in
the vicinity were combined, the Soviets would still
outnumber U.S. -Japan forces by a ratio of 2:1. Of concern
to the Japanese is the increased level of Soviet air
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West Pac East Pac Total USSR
Naval Ships 7th Fleet 3rd Fleet Pacific Fleet Pacific Fleet
Aircraft Carriers
Attack 2 4 6
Helicopter 1 5 6 it
Cruisers 2 15 17 13
Destroyers 6 25 31 20
Frigates 14 31 45 55
Total 24 80 105 90
Submarines
Strategic • * 3- 31
Attack 9 31 40 91
Total 9+* 31 + * 43 122
Amphibious 6 26 32 22
Underway
Replenishment 5 25 30 25
Other Support
Ships 3 7 10 60
Sources: CINCPAOFl 1 for US; Defense Intelligence Agency for USSR.
•Deployment location of three I S SNHNs is classified.
Figure 2 Relative Strength of US-USSR Naval Forces : Pacific
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activity near Japan. Flights of long-range aircraft such as
Badgers and Backfire bombers near Japan resulted in 929
scrambles by SDF aircraft in 1982 and in 1983 700 scram-
bles. 55 The Soviet military activity near Japan is very
large and real indeed.
Schemmer provides a chart of trends of Soviet Far
Eastern forces (Figure 3) which indicates a grave develop-




For Japan, the gravest threat which such a buildup
implies is the potential to cut-off Japan's vital oil
imports from the Persian Gulf. Having suffered economically
from both the 1973 and 1978-79 oil crises, Japan has seen
that the U.S. cannot be relied upon to help Japan during
times of oil shortages. The lesson should be greater self-
reliance in the defense of Japan. This lesson, for many
Japanese, helps to explain the current (though modest)
increases in the level of Japanese expenditures for defense.
An examination of what this Soviet military buildup means to
the Japanese will be provided later in this study.
B. SOVIET VIEWS OF JAPANESE REARMAMENT
In a presentation at the Sixth Soviet-America Conference
on Contemporary Asia held 27 May-1 June 1984 at Alma Ata,
Kazakstan S.S.R., Soviet Japanologist K.O. Sarkisov, whose
views are reflective of official Soviet policy, made a
persuasive argument that Japan is currently pursuing a two-
track policy. 57 First, to develop Japan's political
5 5 Westwood, p . 36
.
55 Schemmer, p. 37.
57 K.O. Sarkisov, "Japan and the U.S. in Asia:
Cooperation and Contradictions". Sixth S oviet ^ American
Conference on Contemporary Asia (Alma Ata, Kazakstan s.s.R.,




















*>"> "'O i9'S 980 i»m
''' 1«U UK)
Figure 3 Trends of Soviet Far Eastern Forces
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influence throughout Asia and the world. Secondly, to
develop the military-political alliance with the United
States. The reason these two tracks can be pursued apart
from one another is that so far they have not come into
conflict with one another.
According to Sarkisov, economic growth is the most
important factor in Japan's decision-making process. If in
order to ensure continued economic prosperity Japan must
follow the U.S. lead in the military and political arenas,
then that is the price Japan must pay. He contends the U.S.
has obtained four commitments from Japan, all of which were
forced concessions in exchange for economic prosperity.
These four are: 1) greater involvement in U.S. -Asia
strategy, 2) continued unfriendly behavior by Japan toward
the Soviet Union diplomatically (despite the ever-present
Soviet "good-neighborliness" ) , 3) Japanese assurances of an
increased Japanese military role, and 4) Japanese commitment
to increase economic aid to Asian "frontier states".
Sarkisov adds that the four conditions are forced upon Japan
by the United States; implying that if no pressure were
applied upon Japan no actions would be taken in this direc-
tion. 58 Although this Soviet assertion may have had validity
during the early post-war period for Japan, it becomes less
valid in the 1980s (a point which will be emphasized
throughout this study).
The Soviets view the U.S. under Reagan as trading
economic concessions (i.e. auto exports to the U.S.) for
increased Japanese political- military involvement. There
are other supposed negative by products emanating from
Japan's "sell-out" to the U.S. For example, the Soviets
claim that the August 1984 visit of Japanese Foreign
Minister Abe to the Middle East; ostensibly to offer
Ibid, p. 8
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assistance as mediator in the Iran-Iraq War; was a failure
due to a low level of respect given to Japan in diplomatic
circles arising from Japanese concessions to the
U.S. /Reagan.
The tone of the Soviet paper was alarmist. Sarkisov
cites the four billion dollar loan package to the Republic
of Korea as proof of a rapidly developing Japan-ROK alli-
ance. In actuality, the ROK and Japan have many hurdles to
jump over before that claim becomes a reality, if ever.
Similarly, the Soviets claim that Japan's current ties with
China coupled with an increase in Japanese defense expendi-
tures poses a grave threat to smaller Asian nations. To the
contrary, Southeast Asian nations tend to fear Soviet
aggression far more than Sino- Japanese aggression. 59
Sarkisov concluded by leaving the reader with the
thought that there is no guarantee that Japan's growth will
not grow uncontrolled as militarism in Japan once again
becomes acceptable. In a related article I. Latyshev raises
the history textbook controversy as proof that reactionary
forces within Japan are slowly preparing the population for
a rebirth of the militarism of the nineteen thirties and
early fourties. 60
Hiroshi Kimura, in an article written in March 1982 for
the Journal of Northeast Asian Studies claims that what
worries the Soviets most is the possibility of active
Japanese participation with the PRC and the United States in
an anti-Soviet collective front. Kimura details various
strategies employed by the Soviets to dissuade Japan from
considering entering into such an arrangement.
59 Sheldon W. Simon "Davids and Goliaths: Small
Power-Great Power Relations in Southeast Asia", Asian Survey
23(March 1983): p. 308.
60 1. A. Latyshev, "On Soviet-American Differences in
their Past and Present Approach to Japan". Sixth
Soviet-American Conference on Contemporary Asia (Alma Ata,
Kazakstan S.S.R., May 27 -June- 1, 19 84^, pp. 1-5.
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The first strategy is called the "divide and conquer"
strategy. 61 That is, try to pit one force or group against
another, i.e. the Japanese government against the Chinese or
American governments, Japanese businessmen against the
Japanese government, or (in a clever ploy) pit region
against region (Hokkaido fishermen against the rest of
Japan, i.e. north vs. south!).
This incident found the Soviets giving very limited
fishing priveleges to Japanese fishermen in Hokkaido in the
vicinity of the Soviet -occupied Northern Territories. By
accepting these priveleges the Soviets had hoped to defuse
this volatile issue which tends to unite the Japanese people
against the Soviet Union.
This incident occurred in March 1981 when then Soviet
Ambassador to Japan, Dmitri Polyansky, issued "membership
cards" at the town of Rausu (facing Kunashiri Island) to a
few Japanese fishermen represented by Akagi Munenori,
Chairman of the Japanese- Soviet Friendship Association (also
an LDP Diet member) . Munenori gave unnecessary recognition
to the Soviet claim to the Nothern Territories by accepting
the cards. This was a successful ploy. 62
A second strategy involves a false display to others for
deceptive purposes. Soviet Ambassador Polyansky was well
known for using this technique. He would issue false state-
ments to Tokyo indicating a possible breakthrough in the
ongoing diplomatic impasse, and then secure meetings with
high-level Japanese officials. Upon meeting with Polyansky
the officials would find Polyansky had nothing to offer at
all; rather he obtained cheap propoganda for the Soviets at
the expense of the Japanese.
61 Hiroshi Kimura, "Recent Japan-Soviet Relations: From
Clouded to Somewhat Crystal". Journal of Northeast Asian
Studies 1 (March 1982): p. 13.
62 Ibid, p. 16.
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Kimura describes a third strategy which is the use of
historical "facts" and arguments to "legally" prove their
case as having legitimacy under international law, all
others ostensibly operating outside of the law. This was
used in 1981 when Prime Minister Suzuki headed a renewed
call for the return of the Northern Territories to Japan. 63
These attempts at historical "mind games" are largely unsuc-
cessful. Nevertheless, the Soviets repeatedly use this
strategy
.
A fourth Soviet strategy is to get the Japanese to admit
a fait accompli In the case of the Northern Territories
dispute, this is done by using Russian names for the islands
instead of Japanese. If the Soviets get the Japanese to
call the islands by their Russian names, then a fait
accompli, of a sort, will have been won. 6 "
Lastly, the Soviets use the "carrot-and-stick" strategy,
whereby a very minor concession is made, such as limited
fishing rights on tangle (a fish which the Soviets do not
catch) , in certain designated areas of Soviet controlled
waters. In spite of many qualifications on time, size of
catch, etc. this tends to excite overly eager Japanese
government officials who are looking for any signs of Soviet
flexibility. Take such a development and couple it with the
massive Soviet military buildup in the Pacific and a very
coercive strategy results. 65
Interestingly, these strategies have been largely unsuc-
cessful with the Japanese, because they've made certain
crucial errors of judgement. First, many Japanese think the
Soviets have no real foreign policy aimed solely at Japan;
rather the Soviet's Japan policy is a spin-off of their U.S.
63 Ibid, p. 16
6
"Ibid, p. 16
6 5 Ibid, p. 18.
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policy. ss Additionally, the Soviets have a tendency to talk
down to the Japanese, who logically consider their system
far superior to the Soviet system. This Soviet tendency
infuriates many Japanese. After all, the Japanese are not
asking the Soviets for their technology!
Soviet writings afford ample support for Kimura's anal-
ysis. In the paper by I. Latyshev, also written for the
Alma Ata Conference, we find examples of Kimura's points. It
begins, interestingly enough, with a Soviet historical
interpretation of the events in Japan following the end of
the Second World War. The Soviet claims that the U.S.,
against Soviet wishes, influenced Japan to reverse course
from its newly found pacifist nature and be revived mili-
tarily. He cites the formation of the SDF as the most
important link in the overall U.S. anti-Soviet strategy.




Latyshev cited several reasons for Soviet concern over a
"remilitarized" Japan. First, it poses a potential threat
to the U.S.S.R.'s Far Eastern borders. Second, the Soviets
fear the use of Japan as a U.S. "springboard" into the
Soviet Union. Third, the Soviets believe that Japan remains
essentially a U.S. puppet, dependent economically, cultur-
ally, politically and militarily. 68 Such assertions were
fairly accurate at one time. The flaw in this Soviet view
of Japan is that it has not changed with the times. The
Soviets (like many Americans) tend to view the Japan of the
1980s like the early post-war Japan of twenty to thirty
years ago. Japan has transformed itself into a major power
66 Ibid, p. 21.
67 Latyshev, p. 3
S8 Ibid
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in its own right, yet it is not given major power status by
the Soviets.
Latyshev admits that Japan grew increasingly independent
from the United States as it grew economically; however he
claims that whenever the Soviet Union and Japan were on the
verge of improving Japanese- Soviet relations (thanks to
Soviet "good neighborliness" ) , the United States would step
in to block these "peaceful" initiatives. This was argued
through historical examples from independence in 1952 to the
present. Under President Reagan, the Soviets claim Japan
has been coerced into using anti-Soviet rhetoric for
Japanese consumption, thereby creating hostility among
Japanese. The somewhat famous mis-quote by Prime Minister
Nakasone in January 1983 where Japan was supposedly offered
to the U.S. as an "un-sinkable aircraft carrier" is a case
in point. 69 Obviously, any statement Nakasone made of an
anti-Soviet nature, however misquoted, did not need
prompting by the United States. Nakasone T s long-standing
ant i- Communist record speaks for itself; from the American
perspective Nakasone is the most conservative prime minister
Japan has seen in a long, long time.
Latyshev then switched the tone of his article and
issued what I would term standard Soviet propogandist ic
"scare tactics". To be specific, Latyshev pointed out that
since Japan has succumbed to U.S. pressures and designated
the U.S.S.R. as its "sole enemy", the Soviets have no choice
but to respond with "eternal vigilance". In other words, if
the Japanese want the Soviets to ease up militarily in the
Pacific, all that is required of the Japanese is to expell
the Americans. 70 Next, Latyshev issued the Soviet promise
not to ever use nuclear weapons against Japan if Japan would
S9 Raian Menon, "The Soviet Union in East Asia". Current
History (October 1983): p. 340.
70 Ibid, p. 15.
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eliminate the "it can neither be confirmed nor denied" U.S.
nuclear umbrella. In other words, if Japan gives the "boot"
to the U.S., it will be free from a nuclear nightmare. Also
implied is that poor Japanese- Soviet relations are attribu-
table to the United States alone, and in no way involves the
Soviet Union or Japan. 7 1
In summation, the Soviets believe Japan today is under-
going a process of remilitarization, not a legitimate
defense buildup. The history textbook controversy is
frequently cited as proof of this. The election and subseq-
uent reelection of Yasuhiro Nakasone as prime minister; the
four billion dollar loan to the ROK; the recent participa-
tion in RIMPAC exercises; the pledge to defend the sealanes
of communications out to 1,000 nautical miles, etc. are all
indications to the Soviets of a new dangerous force in east
Asia. The extreme Soviet reaction to the "unsinkable
aircraft carrier" remark indicates the concern the Soviets
have over recent Japanese developments. One Soviet commen-
tator stated that "there are no un-sinkable aircraft
carriers". 72 and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
warned that the Japanese might be subject to an attack even
worse than that on Hiroshima. 73
Having examined the nature of the Soviet military threat
and efforts by the Soviet Union to influence Japan's deci-
sion - making process, we will now examine how other key
world players view Japanese rearmament and what direction
they would prefer to see this process take. This is essen-
tial if we desire a full understanding of the limits by
which the United States might reasonably take Japan toward a
more equitable defense burden- sharing arrangement.
71 Ibid, p. 17.
72 Menon, p. 340.
73 Kimura, p. 20.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL VIEWS OF JAPANESE REARMAMENT
Although U.S. efforts to obtain a more equitable defense
arrangement with Japan is essentially a bilateral issue, it
has multilateral implications throughout the world.
Although increased Japanese defense expenditures would have
a world-wide impact, our primary interest should be an exam-
ination of those areas which would be of particular
interest. Those areas are the PRC , the Korean
Peninsula(both the ROK and the DPRK) , ASEAN and Western
Europe. Also worthy of mention are the role which Australia
and New Zealand play in the region. One could argue that
other regions should or must be included in this discussion,
i.e. the Middle East, Taiwan, India, etc; however these do
not impact as directly upon the decision-making processes of
either Tokyo or Washington as do the former areas.
A. WESTERN EUROPE
Western Europe and Japan share much in common. Both the
European nations and Japan are highly industrialized modern
states, dependent upon the U.S. for its military strength to
oppose the Soviet bloc. However, some would argue that the
"iron curtain" described by Winston Churchill is much more
evident in Western Europe, with a divided Germany for all to
see, than it is in Japan. The massive Warsaw Pact military
buildup in conventional and nuclear force size is very real
and obvious. this produces a stronger sense of realpolitik
7
**Masashi Nishihara, "Promoting Partnership: Japan and
Europe". Washington Quarterly (Winter 1983): p. 110.
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in Europe than it does in Japan. 74 If Japan had been divided
at war's end: half communist and half free, the Japanese
scholars in "free" Japan would no doubt have a greater sense
of realpolitik as well.
Japan's self-imposed restrictions on offensive military
actions and collective defense rights hinders progress with
Western Europe. Western Europe operates in a broad network
of multilateral alliances and arrangements, yet Japan will
not even commit forces to a U.N. peace-keeping operation.
Some nations, particularly France and the United
Kingdom, have expressed doubts as to whether any real coop-
erative relationship can be worked out between Europe and
Japan, especially given the high level of Japan-U.S. inter-
dependence. 75 A recent survey conducted by the Japanese
Foreign Ministry in Western Europe indicates that sixty two
percent of Britons, sixty percent of French and fourty nine
percent of West Germans believe Japan is not bearing inter-
national responsibilities commensurate with its economic
power. They pointed to Japan's low defense expenditures
(0.9% GNP) and foreign aid (0.3% GNP) as reasons why they
believe this to be so. 75
One negative aspect from the European perspective is the
likelihood of Japan competing with Europe for U.S. military
aid in the event of a global war. If Japan finds itself
competing with Europe for U.S. resources, it would probably
lose out in the event the United States were forced to
choose between one or the other, not withstanding the high
level of economic interdependence between the U.S. and
Japan. It would behoove Japan to adjust its defense
75 Ibid, p. 108.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid, p. 111.
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policies now, not when WWIII breaks out. 77 If this scenario
can be impressed upon the Japanese, it may contribute to a
more realistic European- Japanese defense dialogue.
Skepticism amongst Europeans over Japan's reliability in
a world emergency is high. Many firmly believe that if war
erupted in Europe (but not in Japan) and the U.S." rushed to
Europe's rescue, and in the process asked Japan to mine and
block its strategic straits to prepare for potential hostil-
ities in the Pacific, that Japan would refuse. Japan must
understand that if this ever came about it would risk total
alienation from both Europe and the United States; in addi-
tion the United States would likely use such inaction as
grounds for immediate termination of the Mutual Security
Treaty. 7 8
Another important point is that the current economic
imbalance between Europe and Japan tends to exacerbate the
defense debate. The European Economic Community in 1985 is
mired in an economic recession, and finding itself seriously
hurt by Japanese inroads into the European market. Some,
such as France, have resorted to "stall" tactics to protect
affected industries, i.e. VCRs , TVs, etc. Up until now, the
Europeans have been relying upon Japanese Voluntary




This is not to suggest that the Japanese have caused the
economic depression in Western Europe. Even if comparable
products were evenly priced, it is doubtful that the econo-
mies would suddenly experience a drastic improvement. Like
the United States, Western Europe is paying increased atten-
tion to trade deficits with Japan, and neither can ignore
Japan's defense policies while experiencing these deficits.
7 8 Ibid, p. 112
79 Frank Langdon, "Japan and West Europe". Current
History 82(November 1983): p. 377.
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Their electorates will not tolerate this, nor will special
interest groups hurt by an economically strong Japan.
An article by Shin'ichi Ichimura for Asian Survey raises
another aspect of European- Japanese differences. That is,
Japan ranks fourteenth in the world in terms of percentage
of GNP devoted to Official Development Assistance (ODA)
.
8 °
If you look at the nature of Japan's ODA assistance, we find
that the percentage ODA of a technical nature is only 10.4
percent, ranking behind the United Kingdom (24.2%), West
Germany (37.6%), the Netherlands (22%) , among others. In
terms of absolute numbers, Japan ranks seventh in technical
aid behind France, West Germany, the United States, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium. 81 It is little
wonder that a 1980 EC report said the "...Japanese are
workaholics living in rabbit hutches". 82 Obviously, the
Europeans are disturbed over the Japanese tendency to put
economic success above all else (a wide spread perception)
.
In spite of European pessimism toward Japan, there is
some evidence that Japan may be slowly awakening to the
possibility of the need to broaden its defense relations
with Western Europe. First, informal military contacts have
been established between the Japanese Director Generals of
the SDF and NATO chiefs since 1978 through annual visits. 83
During the 1979 visit of Director General Ganri Yamashita to
Brussels, he expressed the belief that Japan and Western
8
"Shin'ichi Ichimura, "Japan and Southeast Asia". Asian
Survey 20(July 1980): p. 759.
81 Ibid, p. 760.
82 Ibid.
83 Nishihara, p. 114
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Europe must pool its ideas on defense questions. The
Europeans responded by expressing a desire to hear
Yamashita's views on Soviet developments in the Far East for
possible "lessons learned" - type applications in Western
Europe. 8 *
Yamashita claimed that Japanese perceptions * of Soviet
military strategy "overlaps" with NATO thinking on several
key points. Both NATO and SDF members expressed concern
over the expanding Soviet naval threat. The U.S. government
privately expressed delight in the visit as another step in
the evolution of Japanese defense attitudes from an inward -
looking policy to an outward - looking, global interdepen-
dent framework for analysis; as part of the "western alli-
ance". The U.S. position is that Japanese contacts with
NATO speeds up this process. 85
Further evidence of a broadening of defense attitudes
toward the west includes the 1979 declaration of Japan's





declaration marked a departure from a regional to a global
foreign policy. In 1980 the Japanese Navy participated with
the British in a naval exercise for the first time. In
March 1982 the Director General of the SDF visited the
British Defense Committee of the House of Commons, also a
"first".' In May 1982, 150 Diet members established a
Council on Japan-U. S . -European Comprehensive Security, for
the purpose of discussing western security issues as well as
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8S Ibid, p. 110
8 7 Ibid, p. 109.
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The more conservative Nakasone government supported
western objections to Soviet pressures directed toward
Poland. Nakasone endorsed the NATO alliance's call for a
reduction of Soviet intermediate-range missiles and endorsed
the U.S. deployment of Pershing-II missiles if arms talks
were to break down. Kiichi Miyazawa (of the Suzuki faction)
called for a broad alliance of Europe, Japan and the United
States to maintain international peace, promote the world
economy and defend freedom and democracy. However, the
specific nature of Miyazawa' s "alliance" was non-military in
nature. 8 8
We can see certain parallels between Western Europe and
the United States. There are similarities in terms of the
trade imbalance with Japan, as well as a disparity in
defense spending as a percentage GNP . On ideological
grounds Japan differs with the U.S. and Europe on constitu-
tional limitations on defense matters. The North Atlantic
community (including the U.S. and Canada) tends to share
concern over the inadequacy of Japan's current defense
arrangements; in this light the U.S. would be wise to
encourage Western Europe to continue to exert pressure upon
Japan to "liberalize" its attitudes on defense issues. This
could be effected by increased Japan-Europe defense contacts
(including participation in joint exercises) coupled with
diplomatic pressure. Given Japan's participation in the
previously mentioned RIMPAC exercises, the prospects for
effecting such change appear good, although not necessarily
as rapid as either some in the United States or Western
Europe might desire. In this way Japan will move toward a






Called a "superpower" by some and a "major power'Vby
others, the People's Republic of China with its one billion
people remains a cultural, historical, military and polit-
ical force in East Asia which has turned towardthe United
States and Japan in recent years as it seeks to modernize.
Since the Sino-Soviet_ split and the Cultural Revolution,
China has openly expressed its anti-Soviet foreign policy.
To a certain degree, China has befriended the west in the
process. As with the case of Western Europe, the implica-
tions of Japanese rearmament is of great concern, but in
different ways from the U.S. and with varied reactions.
There can be little doubt that since the Vietnam War,
China regards the Soviet Union, not the United States, as
the primary threat to peace in Asia. China has increas-
ingly turned to the United States, Japan and the West in
general for economic and technical assistance as it strives
to modernize under Deng Xiaoping 's "Four Modernizations"
program. Consider the following remark in the Peking Review
indicative of official Chinese government foreign policy:
The massive Soviet military buildup in the Far East,
aimed as it is at China, is directed also against the
United. States and Japan.... The Soviet Union thus consti-
tutes a growing threat to Japan and is intensifying its
infiltration or the country. 8
Following the Nixon Shocks in 1971, the Japanese quickly
normalized relations with the PRC in 1972. The PRC soon
called for a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Japan,
which would officially terminate hostilities between the two
nations. However, the treaty did not get signed and rati-
fied until 1978, six years later. Although to outside
observers the treaty seemed little more than nice "window
89 Peking Review 45(1977): p. 30
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dressing" upon improved Sino- Japanese relations, it was more
than mere symbolism to the PRC and Japan. 90
There are several reasons for this. First, the Chinese
would not consider any long term economic arrangements with
the Japanese until the treaty was ratified. The Chinese
agreed to an expected 20 billion dollar trade with Japan
between 1978 and 1985; this was expanded to 90 billion
dollars for 1978 to 1990. The Japanese, like much of the
world, were eager to take advantage of the new promising
China market. 91 However, the Chinese insisted upon inserting
an anti-hegemony clause in the treaty; this made Japanese
politicians uneasy. Ultimately a general anti-hegemony
clause was inserted, which was in line with China's "Three
World's Theory", alluded to in the quote from the Peking
Review earlier. Because no specific nation was mentioned in
the clause, China and Japan were able to assert their own
interpretations without disrupting the treaty, which was
acceptable to both nations. 92
This treaty left the USSR as Japan's only former adver-
sary not to have signed a peace treaty with Japan. Coupled
with China's strong support for Japan on the Northern
Territories issue, Japan became further polarized away from
the USSR and towards the PRC and USA. As in the European
example, this treaty represents another step in the evolu-
tion of Japan's security policy in Asia and the world.
However, China's interests are not in perfect harmony with
Western Europe's.
90 Sudershan Chawla and D.R. Sardesai, eds
.
, Changing
Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia Praeger Specia.
Studies (New York: Praeger Publishers , 1980 ) , p. 36.
9l Ibid, p. 37
92 Ibid, p. 37
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China would like to see a strong Japan to the extent
that Japan has an adequte defense capability, but not a
strongly remilitarized state, which is quite different.
Although no one wishes to see the rise of a militant Japan
in Asia, it would be fair to say that China (and the ROK and
ASEAN as well) has more at stake and more to lose if Japan
rearms with hostile intentions. Many in China still vividly
recall Japanese atrocities in Manchuria and elsewhere. This
was evident in the condemnation which the PRC displayed




China is more ambivalent over Japanese rearmament than
the United States or NATO. China prefers Japan closely tied
to the U.S. over a neutral Japan, because a neutral Japan
would have the potential to become a militant Japan.
However, Japanese skills and technology as well as Japan's
proximity to China should ensure a dominant Japanese posi-
tion in China for the next few years. The PRC is careful
not to allow Japan too much control in its modernization
process, reserving certain domains for the United States,
Western Europe, etc. 9 "
The PRC has expressed dismay over the JSP's repeated
calls for Japan to dissolve the current U . S . -Japanese
security arrangements. The status quo is emphasized; praise
was heaped upon Japan (by the PRC) when Japan formed the
Japanese National Committee for Japan-United States-China
Friendship. Recently, China and Japan have settled down
into a somewhat more subdued relationship, having gotten
over the euphoria of the newly improved status of China's
relations with the west. Both nations appear to be avoiding
93 Claude A. Buss, ed., National Security Interests in
the Pacific Basin with a foreward by VT. CTehn Campbell




the excessive optimism of a few years back to be ensure that
a more realistic and stable relationship evolves. 95
Initially Japan treaded, softly with China, eager to
please the Chinese in exchange for lucrative economic deals.
However, China has involved Japan in some poor investments,
i.e. the Baoshan Steel Complex, which was cancelled and
never completed. The 1980s finds a stiffening of Japanese
attitudes toward the Chinese. Japanese businessmen believe
that China has used up its good deals and it is now time to
engage in a more mature business relationship. 95
In 1982 the Twelfth CCP Congress met at Beijing and
voiced criticism over excessive Chinese dependence upon the
United States and Japan. This raised fears in Japan that
the PRC was actively seeking rapproachment with the USSR, a
very unwelcome prospect. However, Japanese political
leaders generally believe that Japan can dissuade China from
such a course. In November 1983 Hu Yaobang met with Prime
Minister Nakasone in Tokyo; Nakasone in turn visited the PRC
in March 1984. The trips tended to reassure the Japanese of
continued healthy Sino - Japanese relations. Similarly, in
January 1984 Zhao Ziyang visited the United States, followed
by a trip to China by President Reagan later on in the year.
This tended to reassure the Japanese of continued stable
relations between the PRC and USA. 97
The Chinese recognize Japan's potential and treat it
with a healthy respect; for they seek a capable Japanese SDF
but fear a remilitarized Japan out of control. Unlike
Europe, China could not be counted upon to exert pressure
upon Japan to rearm. However, it remains in the interest of
the United States to foster a healthy
95 Tetsuya Kataoka, "Japan's Northern Threat". Problems
of Communism 33(March - April 1984): p. 5.
9S Ibid, p. 6.
97 Ibid, p. 10
46
Tokyo-Beijing-Washington relationship as a political and
diplomatic (if not a military) front of solidarity against
Soviet expansionism in East Asia.
C . ASEAN
Like the Chinese, the member nations of ASEAN have
bitter memories of Japanese occupation during the Second
World War. Like the Chinese, ASEAN roundly condemned the
Japanese for attempting to rewrite their history books to
present the Japanese militarism of the 1930s and 40s in a
more subdued light. The ASEAN member's current policy of
non-alignment and advocacy of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace,
Friendship and Neutrality) make prospects for direct mili-
tary involvement with either Japan or the United States
somewhat remote. However, like the Chinese (generally
speaking), the ASEAN members view the Soviet Union as the
primary threat to peace in the region, along with Vietnam.
However, in terms of more equitable burden- sharing by
the Japanese with the United States, ASEAN remains wary.
ASEAN attitudes toward Nakasone's renewed defense pledges in
Asia can be characterized as "acceptance" vice "support" for
his policies. 98 ASEAN has reason to be less than enthusi-
astic toward Japanese military involvement in Southeast
Asia. The call for defense of the sealanes out to one thou-
sand miles triggers visions of Japanese destroyers steaming
through the Straits of Malacca as in years past. Such a
presence would be largely unwelcome. 99
Why is ASEAN so wary of Japan? First, ASEAN is becoming
increaingly dependent upon Japan economically, and the
nature of trade between ASEAN and Japan tends to be one-way:
9
"Herbert S. Yee, Japan's Relationship with
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ASEAN and
South Korea: From Dependence to Interdependence?" Journal
of Northeast Asian Studies (1983): p. 35.
"Simon, p. 308.
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raw materials from Southeast Asia shipped to Japan. There
is little market for sophisticated Japanese goods in most of
Southeast Asia. Some believe ASEAN is being economically
recolonized by Japan, a concept anethema to this independent
region, which still remembers vividly its anti-colonial
struggles. Japan's calls for a Pacific Economic Community
raises the spectre of another Greater East Asian
Co-Prosperity Sphere (regardless of Japan's actual
motivations ). ID1
Although ASEAN is highly dependent upon Japan, Japan
strives (rather successfully) to avoid excessive economic
interdependence with any nation or region, save the United
States or the Middle East. Accordingly, ASEAN would have
much more to lose than Japan if trade between the two
regions ceased (with its huge oil resources, Indonesia might
be an exception) . It is important for Japan to assure ASEAN
of its importance to Japan to avoid exascerbating this deli-
cate situation. Prime Minister Nakasone's 1983 ASEAN trip
helped to ease the minds of ASEAN' s leaders in this regard,
with repeated promises of increased Japanese economic aid as
well as reassurances of the peaceful nature of Japan's
current modest defense buildup. 101
The 1983 Nakasone visit was very important in improving
ASEAN- Japan relations, especially in light of certain
events. The 1981 Japanese Annual Diplomatic Bluebook ( Waga
Gaiko no Kinkyo ) published by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs , cited the Middle East as the area of greatest
concern to Japan. It also said that alignment with the
United States and the EEC was the "axis" ( kijiku ) of
Japanese diplomacy. However, it said that ASEAN was merely
100 Radha Sinha, "Japan and ASEAN: A Special
Relationship?" The World Today (December 1982): p. 486.
101
"Nakasone Offers Economic Assistance, Defense
Reassurances on ASEAN Visit." Asian Wall Street Journal (8
May 1983): p. 2. — '
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an area in which Japan has to play a primary role in the
maintenance of peace and continued development due to its
proximity to Japan and its close historical ties with Japan.
The Blue Book emphasized the importance of China and Korea,
downplaying Southeast Asia. 102
In addition, Japan's "equidistant" policy toward ASEAN
and Vietnam is viewed by some as a tendency of Japan to
place good economic relations with a hostile nation above
the wishes of a friendly region emboiled in a controversy
with the hostile nation, i.e. the Vietnamese occupation of
Kampuchea. This "equidistant policy", applied to a very
sensitive issue, is a source of annoyance in ASEAN diplo-
matic circles. 103
Another source of apprehension in ASEAN toward Japan
concerns Japan's limited supply of raw natural resources;
that is, a rearmed Japan might resort to military force to
obtain vital resources it is lacking. This overlooks the
modern reality of Japan's economic policies, which have
stressed diversification of access to vital raw resources so
that no one nation or group of nations could bring Japan's
economic machine to a grinding halt. This also overlooks
the fact that Japan has resorted to such an action once
before which resulted in the humiliating defeat of Imperial
Japan, something which most Japanese would likely view as a
"lessons learned" experience which should be avoided at all
costs. Third, despite the relatively low 0.9% GNP devoted
to defense expenditures, it still amounts to a huge defense
budget (when one considers Japan's GNP being the third
largest in the world behind the Soviet Union and the United
States). If the USA, PRC and the USSR were to dramatically
reduce their presence in Southeast Asia, Japan would then
102 Yee, p. 37.
103 Ibid, p. 38
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have the opportunity to fill the power vacuum. Lastly,
ASEAN draws little comfort from Japan's anti-war constitu-
tion, for Southeast Asian nations have undergone numerous
constitutional changes. Consequently, from their perspec-
tive, there is nothing sacred about Japan's constitution. 101*
In consideration of ASEAN' s apprehensions over a rearmed
Japan, Shin'ichi Ichimura offers four gaps between ASEAN and
Japan which could give rise to increased anti- Japanese
policies by ASEAN. They are the income gap between
Southeast Asians and Japanese, the trade gap which tends to
be a one-way street, the dependence gap which is also very
one-sided, and the perception gap, a by product of the first
three. 105 With Japan ranked number seven in economic assis-
tance behind France, West Germany, etc. it is in the
interest of Japan to increase its economic aid to ASEAN in
proportion to its economic size.
In terms of increasing Japan's role in the maintenance
of Pacific Basin security, ASEAN remains (like the PRC
)
ambivalent. A remilitarized Japan, distant from the U.S.
and friendlier with the USSR would be a very frightening
development to ASEAN. Some in Southeast Asia believe that
U.S. efforts to effect increased involvement by Japan in
Pacific Basin security is a ploy to get U.S. forces removed
from the area. From the ASEAN perspective any Japanese
rearmament drive should be in the context of a highly inte-
grated, interdependent relationship with the United States,
involving no lessening of U.S. presence in the region. This
would serve to obstruct a revival of Japanese militarism. 1 ° 6
1 °
"Ichimura, p. 761
105 Ibid, p. 763.
10S William T. Tow, "Japan's Rearmament: The ASEAN
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The lesson for the United States is to strive to allay
any fears ASEAN might have toward Japanese rearmament . The
United States must convince ASEAN that both the U.S. and
Japan consider ASEAN important to them; this could be accom-
plished through keeping ASEAN better informed of any defense
matters which would involve the ASEAN members,* hopefully
creating a forum for ASEAN to express its opinions on such
defense matters directly to the U.S. and Japan. This would
be done through the formation of a regional defense advisory
board, which could meet periodically at various locations,
in a fashion similar to ASEAN' s annual ministerial meetings.
Although neither the U.S. nor Japan would necessarily
agree with ASEAN recommendations or objections, the fact
that ASEAN was included in such discussions would send a
signal to ASEAN that it is to be treated with respect by the
two great powers and not taken for granted. The U.S. "swing
strategy" as well as Japan's commitment to patrol the seal-
anes out to 1,000 miles would seem less threatening; and
make goodwill trips like Nakasone's 1983 visit to Southeast
Asia less necessary; if ASEAN believed it was being treated
as an equal in the international community and allowed to
have a say in defense matters which would affect ASEAN. 107
The United States must endeavor to bring ASEAN closer to an
anti-Soviet security framework. This will involve closer
attention to ASEAN affairs, and most importantly, time, to
ally ASEAN fears of Japan. ASEAN can prove to be either a
barrier or a positive force toward Japanese rearmament,
depending upon how the U.S. treats ASEAN in the future. The
United States cannot afford to ignore this region as it
seeks an increased level of Japanese defense burden- sharing
.
107 Ibid, p. 17.
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D. THE KOREAN PENINSULA
1. The Republic of Korea
Relations between Korea and Japan have suffered from
a heritage of prejudice and colonialism. Many South Koreans
can claim two distinct biases: ant i- Communist and
anti- Japanese . It was for this reason that it took such a
long time for these two nations to normalize and establish
diplomatic relations, with much prodding by the United
States. One of the ironies in the evolution of Republic of
Korea-Japan relations is that in spite of continued
anti- Japanese resentment in Korea, the ROK has increasingly
turned to Japan as the "guiding light" to emulate in pursuit
of economic power.
South Koreans resent being treated as a pawn in
U.S. -Japan relations and publicly shun the notion of being a
defensive buffer for Japan (however, they often try to take
advantage of this, i.e. loan demands made to Japan). 108 This
creates further resentment when Koreans far outspend the
Japanese in national defense as a percentage of GNP . The
fact that Japan refuses to unconditionally place its mili-
tary bases at the disposal of the U.S. armed forces in the
event of an armed conflict in Korea is an even greater irri-
tant. Ironically, the notion of a unified Korea is as
dangerous a notion to many Japanese as a remilitarized Japan
(especially with a nuclear capability) would be to many
Koreans . l ° 9
If one were to look merely at the surface, one might
conclude that ROK-Japan relations are destined to be bogged
down in prejudice and distrust. This is not so. Ties
between Seoul and Tokyo are strong; culturally the Koreans
10 8 Edward A. Olsen, "The Evolution of ROK ' s Foreign
Policy", Washington Quarterly 7(Winter 1984): pp. 74-76.
109 Yee, pp. 38, 39.
52
have far more in common with the Japanese than they do with
Americans. Both nations are influenced by the continuing
importance of maintaining close ties with the United States.
Let us examine how ROK-Japan relations have evolved since
the Korean War.
The Rhee years were a tense period in the evolution
of this relationship. According to W.D. Reeve, a British
scholar, the foreign policy goals under Syngman Rhee were
four-fold:
Put succinctly, if a trifle brutally, the foreign policy
goals of the Republic under President Rhee-and in the
main under the successor governments as well-may be
summarized as: 1. to regularize, on its own terms, the
long-embittered relations with Japan; 2. the reunifica-
tion of Korea, again on its own terms; 3. implacable
hostility to Communism; 4. to continue to extract the
maximum possible amount of American aid while at the
same time resisting any American encroachment on its
sovereign rights as an independent state. 110
Syngman Rhee was rabidly anti- Japanese and as long as he
remained in power, no possibility of normalization between
the ROK and Japan would be possible.
Three series of negotiations were held between the
ROK and Japan during the Rhee years: from 1951-1953,
1957-1958 and in 1960. Some basic issues which complicated
matters were property claims and counter-claims, the ques-
tion of Koreans residing in Japan, fishing rights and the
"Rhee Line", the Takeshimas Islands issue, but to name a
few. 111 As an example of just how bad the feelings were
between Koreans and Japanese during this period, in October
1953 the head of the Japanese delegation, Kanichiro Kubota,
was said to have proclaimed that the establishment of the
Republic of Korea was illegal under international law as
110 W.D. Reeve, The Republi c of Korea: A Political and
Economic Study (London: Oxford University Press-; 1963 ) , p.
llx Ibid, pp. 52 - 61.
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Japan's ownership of Korea was not subject to disposal by
the allied powers and to have also claimed that Japan right-
fully owned eighty-five percent of all land and property in
Korea and would exact damages for the ruin it suffered
during the Korean War. This may have been an exaggeration
by the Koreans, yet Kubota was known in fact to have said
"Japanese rule had contributed to the Korean railway system,
harbor construction, " expansion of rice paddies and food
production, and changed bald mountains into green ones". 112
The Koreans were infuriated over the remark; further
talks were held off until an apology was delivered. The
Japanese waited until April of 1957 to offer an apology!
Obviously, relations were not very good between the ROK and
Japan during the Rhee years
.
During this period, following the conclusion of an
unofficial trade agreement between Japan and the PRC , South
Korea broke off trade relations with Japan and banned travel
between the ROK and Japan. Many Japanese fishing boats were
seized, and by February 1959, 153 Japanese fishermen had
been detained by the Rhee government. Then, with the
removal of Rhee and the eventual takeover by Park Chung Hee
in May 1961, the way was paved for normalization of
ROK- Japan relations. President Park knew normalization
would aid in rapid economic development for his country.
A basic understanding of the terms for normalization
between the ROK and Japan was reached in 1962 by Japanese
Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira and KCIA Director Kim Chong
Pil. However, the Ikeda government was unwilling to bear
the political pressures of signing a treaty with the ROK;
normalization had to wait for the arrival of the more
112 Ibid, pp. 56, 57.
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conservative Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. The treaty, signed
in 1965, paved the way for increased Japanese-South Korean
cooperation.
Three essential interests guided Korea's policy
toward Japan. 113 The first was that Japanese economic assis-
tance was considered vital to the ROK's development plans.
The Japanese contributed from 19.3% to 30% of all support
for the ROK's first" three five-year plans. Secondly,
Korea's policy toward Japan involved the role Japan plays in
South Korea's security, especially regarding the use of U.S.
bases in Okinawa and Japan proper. The "Korean Clause" of
joint U.S. -Japan defense statements would be repeatedly
cited by ROK officials as a basis for Japan's obligation to
help maintain the ROK's security, especially by contributing
to the ROK's industrial base.
The third ROK objective involved concern over
Japanese trade with the North Koreans and problems generated
by anti-ROK/pro-DPRK Koreans living in Japan. Many Korean
organizations in Japan fit that description, which irritated
the ROK government . As long as Prime Minister Sato was in
power in Japan, Japanese involvement with North Korea was
kept to a minimum. : ^
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the primary instru-
ment of ROK-Japan diplomacy (officially) was the annual
ministerial conferences held once a year alternatively in
Tokyo or Seoul. Also of use to the ROK government was a
broad-based Korean-Japan Cooperation Committee located in
Japan, headed by Nobuske Kishi. On the private side, the
Korean- Japanese Economic Cooperation Committee led by promi-
nent Korean and Japanese businessmen provided a good forum
for discussion. In the mid-1970s the Korean-Japan
113 Fuji Kamiya, "The Korean Peninsula after Park Chung
Hee", Asian Survey 22 (July 1980): pp. 744-753.
114 Ibid, p. 750.
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Friendship Association and the Parliamentarian's League were
formed in Japan to counter pro-North Korean groups. The
Parliamentarian's League was comprised of Korean and
Japanese lawyers dedicated to solidifying ROK-Japan ties
following the Vietnam debacle. It should be mentioned that
the above organizations by no means represent all of the
interactions between South Koreans and Japanese, but they
are indicative of much of the official interaction which has
gone back and forth. 115
The departure of Sato in 1972 coupled with various
events in Korea and the world caused ROK-Japan relations to
suffer their worst strain since the Rhee years. The "Nixon
Shocks" opened the door to U.S.-PRC normalization and led to
the downfall of Sato. The Tanaka government which followed
Sato's failed to iterate the necessity of maintaining South
Korea's security following Japan's normalization with the
PRC in 1972. Then, to add insult upon injury, Japan shut
down its offices in Seoul for those firms dealing with the
PRC at the PRC ' s insistence (Zhou Enlai made the demand).
Then the U.S. pulled out the Seventh Division from
Korea as the rapproachment between the U.S., Japan and the
PRC grew. This convinced President Park that severe
internal measures in Korea would be necessary to ensure
domestic control by passing the rigid Yushin Constitution
into law and imposing renewed martial law. This served to
anger anti-ROK forces in Japan who considered Park's meas-
ures far too harsh. Finally, ROK dissident Kim Dae Jung was
kidnapped from Japan by Korean agents in August 1973 to be
brought to trial. This outraged the Japanese government and
press; accordingly the Tanaka government postponed its
annual ministerial conference scheduled for that same
115 Ibid, p. 748.
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month. 116 After an apology (of sorts) was sent to Tanaka by
ROK Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil, the conference was held
several months later, in December.
The year after the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo, 1974,
proved to be even more disastrous for ROK- Japan relations.
In the spring of that year the "Democratic Youth and Student
League Incident" occurred, whereby two Japanese youths were
arrested in Korea for an alleged plot to overthrow the ROK
government. Then, in August 1974, President Park's wife was
killed by Moon Se Kwang , a pro-DPRK Korean living in Japan.
The ROK government demanded an apology from Japan for
failing to prevent the incident and a promise to restrict
the activities of pro-DPRK Korean communists living in Japan
(i.e. the "General Confederation of Korean Residents in
Japan"). Japan refused on both counts. 117
Additionally, by 1974 Japanese trade had increased
with the DPRK to $360 million from $58 million in 1971
(according to the International Monetary Fund - IMF). To
add more "fuel to the fire", Japanese Foreign Minister
Kimura told the Japanese Diet that the ROK "faced no threat
from the North" - a direct challenge to Park's primary
excuse for tight control, martial law, and other excessive
measures. He went on to say that "Seoul was not the only
lawful government in the Korean Peninsula". 118
Two things prevented ROK-Japan relations from dete-
riorating totally at this point - U.S. intervention and the
fall of the Tanaka government resulting from the "Lockheed
Scandal". From 1975 to 1977 the Miki government in Japan
sought an end to the Kim Dae Jung problem and to improving
ROK-Japan relations. Hahn Bae Ho in 1980, gave a good idea
116 Ibid, p. 751.
117 Ibid
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of the evolving trend in Japan which the Japanese government
can be expected to pursue, although as of 1985 it had yet to
be realized:
The trend set by the Tanaka government and further
?ursued by the sucessive governments in Japan is likely
o continue and affect the future of Korea - Japan rela-
tions in the coming decade. This does not mean that the
Seikei Bunri formula as in the case of Japan's relations
with the PRC and Taiwan. The volume of Japan - South
Korea trade remains large and will probably continue to
increase in the next decade, but Japan is likely to
steer its diplomatic and security positions away from
the relatively firm commitment to South Korea which
Japan had once made in the past. Rather Japan would
place more emphasis on the preservation of the status
quo by leaning toward a diplomacy of equidistance based
on a two-Koreas policy. 119
Back in 1969 the Nixon- Sato Communique defined the
ROK as essential for Japan's security. By 1975, with the
downfall of Tanaka, Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa clari-
fied his statement by asserting that the U.S. could not use
bases in Japan for launching strikes against the DPRK , but
he included a caveat that they might be used if the U.S.
obtained U.N. approval, indicating there would be some flex-
ibility. Then in August 1975 a joint statement was formally
issued by President Ford and Prime Minister Miki emphasizing
the importance of South Korean security, with Japan empha-
sizing the need to preserve the peace on the Korean
Peninsula
.
This seemingly vacillating position of Japan in its
official attitude toward the importance of the ROK in the
maintenance of Japan's internal security can be explained in
part by the Japanese political system. The LDP as the
dominant political force in Japan views the ROK as being
119 Hahn Bae Ho, "Korea - Japan Relations in the 1970s",
Asian Survey 20 (November 1980): p. 1097.
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strategically and economically important to Japan (and
increasingly, so do the opposition parties), and it encour-
ages friendly U. S . -ROK- Japan relations.
In terms of economic policy, Japan has adopted a
neutral stance; it is this policy which the ROK has been
emulating to a large extent. This concept of economic
diplomacy (examined earlier) , which Japan has initiated and
which the ROK emulates, is the ROK ' s key toward the pursuit
of an independent foreign policy from the United States. In
Japanese style, the ROK is making inroads in the Middle
East, Africa and Southeast Asia. Seoul, like Tokyo, depends
upon imports of raw materials and exports of finished goods
for its economic well-being. Under President Chun Doo Hwan,
the ROK has softened its ant i- Communist rhetoric, is
expanding the number of its trading partners, and is acting
less according to the wishes of the United States.
In terms of burden- sharing , President Chun requested
ten billion dollars from Japan for security assistance so as
to more equitably share in the defense of the region, in
August 1981. Prime Minister Nakasone responded with $4
billion in "foreign economic assistance" to the ROK in 1983,




° In September 1984 President Chun Doo
Hwan visited Japan and met with Prime Minister Nakasone and
Emperor Hirohito. This trip, although largely symbolic,
went very smoothly. It may have paved the path for
increased ROK-Japan involvement in terms of mutual
defense 121 Considering the relative decline of the U.S.
military vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in East Asia, the devel-
opments in the past couple of years have been quite positive
in terms of improving ROK-Japan relations.
12 Olsen, p. 73
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Shim Jae Hoon, "Pride and Prejudice". Far Eastern
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One might conclude that with the ROK spending about
six or seven percent of its GNP toward defense compared with
Japan's one percent, and with the close proximity of the ROK
to Japan and their close relationships with the United
States, that the ROK would be a strong ally of the U.S. in
its efforts to effect an increase in Japanese defense
burden- sharing. However, not all Koreans share this view.
Personal enmity between Koreans and Japanese remains high in
1985 , and there are many Koreans around who remember the
atrocities of the Japanese occupation of Korea who would be
apprehensive of any revival of militarism which could accom-
pany a commensurate increase in military strength. We can
see, as with the PRC and ASEAN, a reluctance to push Japan
too hard for fear that Japan will turn into a
"Frankenstein's Monster" which the United States will be
unable to control. From the South Korean perspective, any
Japanese buildup should not equate to any reduction of U.S.
forces in the region, and it should be closely integrated
and interdependent with U.S. forces.
2 . The Democratic People ' s Republic of Korea
When examining the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK) , it becomes necessary to determine first what
is its status in the global power scheme. Is the DPRK a
Soviet proxy? Or is it a Chinese proxy? Does the DPRK pose
a direct threat to the ROK as well as an indirect threat to
Japan and the United States as well? These are the ques-
tions which will be addressed in this portion of this study.
North Korea is neither a Soviet nor a Chinese proxy.
Rather, it is a self-styled independent nation with its own
style of Communism. However, it is highly dependent upon
the Soviet Union as well as the People's Republic of China;
therefore as the Sino-Soviet split has festered since the
early sixties, the DPRK ' s relationship with these two Asian
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powers has become increasingly complex. 122 Kim II Sung,
North Korea's leader since its inception as a nation, has
played a see-saw back-and- forth game with the Soviets and
the Chinese through the changing times, yet never going so
far into one camp that it totally and irreversibly alienates
the other camp. How has Kim managed to accomplish this?
The answer goes back to 1945.
It was the Soviet Union which entered North Korea in
1945 and allowed a communist government to be created in the
first place. Without Soviet expansion into the peninsula,
Kim would not have had the opportunity to rise to power.
Therefore the very existence of the North can be traced to
the Soviet Union. In addition, Kim was in the Soviet army
and was a strong supporter of Joseph Stalin. 123
China on the other hand was responsible for the
survival of North Korea as a nation. General MacArthur
appeared unstoppable as the Allied forces pressed closer and
closer to the Yalu River. It was the intervention of
300,000 Chinese troops which saved Kim's regime. Kim owed a
huge debt to Mao Zedong's government', and Kim demonstrated a
strong affinity for Mao Zedong as he did for Stalin. 12 "
Without going into a detailed history of the see-saw
relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing and Moscow,
suffice it to say that North Korea has not been able to
maintain cordial with both powers simultaneously. The
"liberalism" of Nikita Kruschev turned Kim away from the
Soviets and toward the Chinese. The radicalism of Mao
Joseph M. Ha and Jae Kyu Park, eds
.
, The Soviet Union
and East Asia in the 1980s IFES Research Series NoT
T8~tSeoul : KyungnanTUniversity Press, 1983), pp. 165.




during the Cultural Revolution had the opposite effect. At
other times Kim II Sung's brash, hostile and provacative
acts toward the South Korean and U.S. forces along the DMZ
have forced either the USSR or the PRC to withdraw aid and
support from Kim, fearful of being entangled in a fruitless
superpower confrontation. 125
Helen-Louise Hunter, a U.S. government specialist on
the Far East, sums up" Kim's policy toward the Soviet Union
and China rather neatly:
For a number of reasons, Kim has deliberately sought to
conceal the true state of relations with Moscow and
Beijing. Among other things, this has made it easier
for the Soviets and the Chinese to change directions, in
seeking closer or not-so-close relations with Pyongyang.
In this way, Kim has managed to keep his options open,
always allowing for the possibility of improved rela-
tions with one country when relations with the other
deteriorate. In this sense, he has probably managed as
well as he could have in playing both sides-not at the
same time-but at different times. Although he may not
have maximized the amount of political, military, or
economic support that either the USSR or China might
have given him, had he chosen to commit himself to one
side or the other, as Castro has, for instance, he has
preserved his independence of policy, which Castro has
not. He has not become a stooge or either the Soviets
or Chinese . x 2 6
Turning to Japan, what are Japan's interests in the
Korean Peninsula? Put simply, they are to maintain the
balance of power in the region through U.S. military assis-
tance to the ROK, and to maintain an equidistant trading
policy with all the principle "players" in the region: the
USSR, PRC, DPRK and ROK. In other words, they are to assert
the Japanese principle of seikei bunri , examined previously.
The ROK has emerged as the stronger of the two Koreas in
terms of economic power, and is increasingly accepted in the
125 Tae-Hwan Kwak, Wayne Patterson and Edward A. Olsen,
eds
.
, IFES Research Series No. 20 The Two Koreas in World
Politics (Seoul: Kyungnam UniversitTy-" Press, 198TT pp.
1 9 5 - 20 1.
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international community as an independent nation in its own
right, no longer a U.S. "puppet" (hence Seoul being awarded
the 1988 Summer Olympic Games). Militarily, the ROK appears
on the verge of parity with the North, if it has not
achieved that status already. 127
Japan remains of primary concern to the United
States in the region, but with South Korea's enhanced
economic status as a U\ S . trading partner, the U.S. mission
in the ROK has become far more than preventing the Korean
Peninsula from becoming a "dagger in the back" of Japan.
Both Seoul and Tokyo are cognizant of their relative impor-
tance to the United States in this regard. 128
In terms of the prospects for increased U.S. -Japan
defense burden- sharing , the continued unpredictable nature
of Kim II Sung should ensure the need for a large military
presence in the South for years to come. If Kim dies, the
nature of his successor's rule could not be relied upon to
be any less unpredictable, until events would indicate
otherwise. Therefore, from the American perspective, North
Korea's hostile presence just a few miles from Seoul, serves
to bolster the U.S. argument that Japan must do more in the
maintenance of security in Northeast Asia, not just for
Japan proper but for Korea as well, where the economic
stakes are almost as high as the military stakes.
Other key players views must be addressed as well,
notably Australia and New Zealand. The ANZUS Pact formed in
1952 was originally designed to prevent a resurgence of
Japanese militarism, not stop Soviet expansionism, since the
Soviets were allies during WWII. As one may expect, the
Australians and New Zealanders are quite ambivalent toward
rapid Japanese rearmament . To many "down under" , the
127 William J. Barnds , ed., The Two Koreas in East Asian
Affairs (New York: N . Y. University Press, 1976), p. 177.
128 Ha, p. 165.
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memories of Japanese conquests in WWII are very real and
very painful. Like ASEAN, the PRC, and the ROK, Australia
and New Zealand represent a political force which the United
States must deal with openly and delicately, or it could
result in negative pressures being applied upon Japan, in
direct contradiction with U.S. foreign policy goals.
Another aspect of Australia and New Zealand's rela-
tionship with Japan is their common interest in Pacific
Basin Security. Unlike the United States, which tends to
view conferences on Pacific Basin security as little more
than an interesting area for debate and discussion; to the
Australians, New Zealanders , and Japanese these are serious
calls for the establishment of some sort of framework which
would enable the Pacific Basin concept to become a reality.
This calls for a combination of diplomatic, political,
economic, and potentially military forces among partici-
pating nations to promote progress and prosperity and to
secure peace in the Pacific Basin. 129 This would fit in
closely with the Japanese concept of Comprehensive Security,
accordingly, the United States should make an effort to
treat discussions on Pacific Basin security in a more
serious fashion. This would seem a logical direction to
encourage the Japanese in their defense spending, as it
would closely integrate their forces with those nations
participating in such an arrangement, reducing fears of a
remilitarized Japan. 130
In light of New Zealand's adamant refusal to accept
nuclear vessels in New Zealand ports, new fuel may have been
added to the anti-nuclear movement world-wide. This could
have implications for Japan if opposition parties in Japan
are able to seize the issue to effect political change in
129 Buss, p. 204
130 Ibid
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Japan. Recently, Hu Yaobang of the PRC announced that the
United States had given China assurances that a scheduled
naval visit would consist of non-nuclear forces, which in
fact was never promised. Obviously, this development could
have an impact on the United State's ability to maintain an
active military presence throughout the world, not just in
Japan, therefore it is more appropriately addressed in a
separate thesis.
E . SUMMARY
We have examined the ROK, the DPRK , the PRC, Western
Europe/NATO, and ASEAN; and earlier the Soviet Union; in an
effort to understand how the different key players view the
prospects for Japanese rearmament as the United States
continues to push Japan to increase its share of the defense
burden.
In summary, there is no clear consensus between the
various world players examined in this chapter. If the U.S.
is to maximize Japanese defense burden- sharing with minimal
protest /maximum cooperation from other nations in the world
(particularly those nations highlighted in this study), then
the U.S. must be prepared to take the diplomatic and
political steps to effect the same.
We shall now turn our attention to current schools of
thought within Japan to gain an appreciation for the posi-
tive and negative forces within Japan which will either
hinder or promote an increased role by Japan in the defense
burden- sharing process.
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V. JAPANESE VIEWS ON DEFENSE
Scholars of Japanese strategic thought use different
labels to characterize the various schools of thought preva-
lent in Japan today. Regardless of who you read, they tend
to be categorized into four basic categories. Mike
Mochizuki, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale
University, analyzed these categories. They are the
"unarmed neutralists" (moderate-to-far left), "political
realists" (moderate/ left ) , "military realists" (moderate/
right), and "Japanese Gaullists" (far right). 131
The unarmed neutralists and the Japanese Gaullists
represent a small minority and play a minor role in influ-
encing the Japanese decision- making process. The political
realists and the military realists are more indicative of
mainstream Japanese political thought and are well repre-
sented within the LDP. Yasuhiro Nakasone is a well - known
military realist.
On the moderate- to- far left, the unarmed neutralists
believe that there is little military threat to Japan from
the USSR, with Soviet influence on the downside in recent
years. Recognizing Japan's dependency on foreign imports of
raw materials, they advocate self-sufficiency in grain
production and alternative energy supplies, with a big
emphasis on stockpiles. They do not back the formation of a
large navy to protect Japan's sea-lanes, citing WWII as the
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Politically, the unarmed neutralists seek abrogation of
the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty coupled with the signing of
treaties of friendship with Japan's Asian neighbors as a
diplomatic sign of goodwill. They advocate maintaining the
Japanese Constitution in its present form in an effort to
oppose moves to increase Japanese defense spending. Their
influence upon the decision making process is small, yet a
March 1981 Asahi Shimbun poll indicated thirty percent
approval of unarmed neutrality. With the recent develop-
ments in New Zealand and China mentioned earlier, this group
has the potential to unravel U.S. foreign policy objectives
and cannot be ignored. 133
On a more complex level, Martin E. Weinstein, Associate
Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois
(and a former research associate at the Brookings
Institute), has identified a "permanent limit thesis",
alternatively referred to as "the fundamental spirit thesis"
( kihon teki seishin ron ) or the "bounds thesis" ( waku ron
) , which tends to represent the views of some advocates of
unarmed neutralism; more broadly the views of many of the
somewhat left-of- center political realists
.
l 3 *
Not as harsh toward defense issues as those of the
extreme left, this theory appeals to those who desire strict
adherance to the status quo as being the best course for
Japan to follow. There are five limits or bounds to this
school of thought:
The spirit of the peace constitution, the principle of
civilian control or the military, the exclusively defen-
sive character of the Self -Defense Force (SDFj, the
three anti-nuclear principles, and the ceiling of 1
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Advocates of the left-wing policies implicit in these
theories include Yoshikazu Sakamoto of the University of
Tokyo, Takeshi Ishida, Hiroharu Seki of the Japan Peace
Research Institute, and writer Hisao Maeda. 136 A quote from
an article written for Japan Quarterly by Hisao Maeda is
illustrative of this group when he said:
the recent noisy farce of the budget-compiling process
suggests that it is more correct to regard the threat to
Japan as coming from the pressure of the United States,
not the military buildup of the Soviet Union. The
United States would like to force Japan to build up its
military strength and integrate it into U.S. global
military strategy. In fact, even if the Soviet Union
were building up its military force as insisted by the
United States and the Defense Agency, this would not be
directly to Japan's disadvantage. 13
Moving on to mainstrean Japanese political thought, the
political realists have dominated the decision-making
process in Japan for most of the post-war era. They base
their thinking upon the Yoshida Strategy, described earlier,
which hinges upon Japanese reliance upon the U.S. -Japan
Security Treaty as the best means of ensuring Japan's
defense needs are being met
.
The political realists are aware of domestic pressures
to keep defense spending down from pacifist sectors in
Japan. In addition, they recognize the dangers of an
economic trade off in exchange for military power.
Nevertheless, they will acknowledge the need for an expanded
role by Japan to help promote world stability through its
economic might. Concerning the Soviet threat, the political
realists tend to look at the political threat more seriously
than the military threat. They fear third world exploita-
tion by the Soviets as the greatest danger to world
1 3 G Mochizuki, p. 163
137 Hisao Maeda, "The Free-Rider Myth", Japan Quarterly
24(April - June 1982): p. 176. — — *
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stability; Japan can provide economic assistance to
strengthen sagging third world economies in an effort to
counter this threat.
Weinstein would describe this group as those advocating
the "basic defense policy" or "fundamental defense capa-
bility plan" ( kibanteki boeiryoku koso ) , which is the
present Japanese defense policy. 138 The premise of this
theory is that the SDF comprises the basis for Japanese
self-defense, with the U.S. military supplementing the SDF.
This is the reverse of the permanent limit thesis which has
the U.S. military bearing the brunt of Japanese defense,
with the SDF supplementing the U.S. forces. Nevertheless,
this theory relies upon the basic reliability of the United
States and the low possibility of Japan being involved in an
armed conflict. Changes in the latter premise are partially
responsible for the recent shift in Japanese public opinion
away from political realism and toward military realism. 139
Advocates of political realism include such scholars as
Hiroshi Kimura, Fuji Kamiya, and Masataka Kosaka. The
Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is the
primary center for these scholars, headed by Masamichi
Inoki . : "* ° For example, I offer a quote by political realist
Hiroshi Kimura explaining the "logic" of Japanese defense
attitudes
:
It is not hard for Western observers, quite irritated by
the logical inconsistencies demonstrated
above (Explanatory Note: concerning the perceived Soviet
threat versus Japanese defense expenditures - RJT), to
criticize the ambiguous and contradictory stand of both
Japanese leaders and public toward such important
matters. By way of explanation, I would like to remind
these rationally minded observers that the coexistence
of apparantly contradictory positions side by side is a
sort of culture-bound feature of the Japanese, with a
138 Chawla, pp. Ill, 112.




long tradition. Hence it may be wrong and unrealistic
for Western critics to expect the Japanese to abandon
this deeply entrenched cultural characteristic over-
night. * S l
Similar to the unarmed neutralists, the political real-
ists recognize the need to diversify Japan's sources of raw
materials and the necessity for developing large stockpiles.
Beyond this there is not much similarity. The U.S. -Japan
alliance is the bulwark of any Japanese security planning
and should be strengthened as necessary to ensure Japan's
security requirements are being met. In light of current
external events, the political realists seek more of a qual-
itative vice a quantitative change in the SDF , unlike the
military realists. 142
The military realists today do not dominate the main-
stream of Japanese strategic thinking, but they are growing
in public acceptance. As proof positive, Prime Minister
Yasuhiro Nakasone was reelected toa second term in office in
1984. Although his election was far from a mandate, the
acceptance of Nakasone as Japan's leader is a solid signal
that a slow but gradual change in Japanese strategic
thinking is definitely underway.
The military realists go beyond supporting the
U.S. -Japan alliance, which to them is an important arrange-
ment but no guarantor of Japanese security. They tend to
analyze the military threat and the required response
without considering domestic opposition. This implies that
if Japan needs to exceed the one percent GNP defense
spending level in order to meet its real security needs
,
then it will do so. Military realists do not place any
significance on the arbitrary self-imposed one percent limit
on Japanese defense expenditures.
lul Kimura, p. 11.
1<,2 Mochizuki, pp. 158 - 165
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The military realists follow the "requisite capability
thesis" as described by Weinstein, otherwise known as the
"as - required defense forces thesis" ( shoyo boeiryoku ron )
or "activist defense thesis" ( sekkyoku boei ron ) . As
Weinstein explains it, this thesis argues that "...the level
of Japan's military capability is woefully insufficient and
that it should be determined not according to the constitu-
tion or to the public opinion but by the magnitude of poten-
tial external contigencies and the extent of actual or
potential adversaries' capabilities. 1 '* 3
The most prolific government official representing this
school of strategic thought in Japan is the former Director
General of the Research and Planning Department of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hisahiko Okazaki. Many retired
officers from the SDF are included in these ranks , and the
Japan Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS) is the main
research group for this school of thought, whose president
is Shin Kanemaru . Others include Jun Tsunoda, Shigeto
Nagano (former Army Chief of Staff), Ken'ichi Kitamura
(former Chief of Naval Operations), and Goro Takeda (former
Chairman of Joint Staff Council). As a proponent of mili-
tary realism, Hisahiko Okazaki wrote:
Although leftists in Japan argue that it may be involved
in a war because of the existence of the U.S. -Japan
Security Treaty and of the U.S. bases in Japan, in fact
it is threatened not because of its military alliance
but because of its geostrategic situation. It would be
unreasonable not to expect a major power to attempt to
seize a geostrategically important area before its oppo-
nent utilizes it, particularly if the country at issue
were inadequately armed. 114 "




Of further significance is that military realists put
their emphasis on military power vice economic power as the
best method of ensuring Japan's security needs are met. Not
relying on the accuracy of other nation's stated intentions,
they prefer to stick to their capabilities as indicators of
what challenges Japan will be facing. 1 '' 5 Additionally, the
"swing strategy", first demonstrated during the Carter
years, led many to face the fact that the U.S. may be spread
too thin in times of world emergencies to effectively assist
Japan.
The Japanese Gaullists represent the small, right-wing
component of Japanese strategic thinking. Unlike the mili-
tary realists, the Japanese Gaullists seek to revise both
the Japanese Constitution and the U.S.- Japan Security
Treaty to allow a massive military buildup which would
reflect Japan's economic power. At present, the military
realists present a much more palatable alternative to the
political realists than do the Japanese Gaullists.
According to sociologist Ikutaro Shimizu, a noted Gaullist,
in "...this age of global unrest every state is alone... we
can rely only on Japan and the Japanese". 146 The Gaullists
want to change the current U.S. - Japan relationship to one
where the two nations enjoy equal status, unlike the "big
brother little brother" relationship which tends to exist
today. Other notable Japanese Gaullists include Hideake
Kase, who served as Special Advisor to Prime Minister Fukuda
for defense matters; Jun Eto, Professor of Comparative
Literature at the Tokyo Institute of Technology; and
Yatsuhiro Nakagawa, a political scientist from Tsukuba
University 1 l* 7
la5 Ibid, pp. 168 - 175.
l * 6 Ibid, p. 166.




Mike M. Mochizuki summed up the Japanese Gaullist's
position:
All the gaullists favor eliminating the constraints
imposed by the government on defense policy including
the ban on arms exports, the three non-nuclear princi-
fles , and the 1 percent of GNP defense spending limit.
or them, Japan is now a grotesque state - an economic
giant and a military dwarf. Only by redefining itself
as a nation can Japan emerge from this abnormal condi-
tion. 1 " 8
Barring any severe changes in the international arena like
those described by Tetsuya Kataoka in Waiting for a "Pearl
Harbor " : Japan Debates Defense the Gaullists have little
chance to emerge as a potent political force. However, like
the unarmed neutralists, the Gaullists cannot be ignored.
The theory behind the Japanese Gaullists as described by
Weinstein is called the "autonomous defense thesis" or j ishu
boei ron alternative. Three forces drive proponents of this
theory, with one or all being in effect - nationalism,
responsibility commensurate with capability, and mistrust of
the United States. The basic thrust is that an independent
nation's defenses are a requirement for its distinction as a
sovereign state. 149
Japan's contemporary external environment has caused the
primary focus of debate to switch from idealism versus
realism to political realism versus military realism. This
bodes well for U.S. defense planners; yet in spite of
Nakasone's reelection the political realists within the LDP
continue to dictate defense policy. It remains to be seen
how quickly, or if at all, Nakasone (or his successor) will
implement changes in the current U.S. -Japan security
arrangements
.
1I,8 Ibid, p. 167.
ia9 Chawla, p. 114
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1. Beyond the Nakasone Administration
Much of the discussion in this section has centered
on the present or near-term future of Japanese politics. A
question logically raised is "what will be the nature of
U.S. -Japan relations following the end of Prime Minister
Nakasone' s second term in office?" I would contend that
Nakasone' s successor would not appreciably alter the current
course Japan is following.
This assumes that the LDP remains the party in
control. Most experts would probably call that a
certainty. 150 If one sets aside the remote possibility of an
alternate party take-over, the issue becomes a focus on the
factions within the LDP. These factions are dominated by
the Tanaka faction with 120 seats, the Suzuki faction with
80 seats, and the Fukuda faction with 72 seats in the
Japanese Diet. 151
Following the 27 February 1985 stroke suffered by
Kakuei Tanaka, the huge Tanaka faction has been in
disarray. 152 A power struggle has ensued, with a battle for
factional control between LDP Vice President Susumu Nikaido
and Finance Minister Noboru Takeshita shaping up. Nikaido
is the "official" faction leader of the Tanaka faction, but
Takeshita is the favorite amongst rank-and-file Tanaka
faction members. 153 Although some analysts point to this
struggle for power as a signal of the "death" of the Tanaka
15
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faction, it would more likely signal the emergence of yet
another political compromise. Ultimately, given Takeshita'
s
popularity, he stands to emerge as the new "official" leader
of the Tanaka faction, with Nikaido continuing to serve for
an agreed upon period of time. At worst, the struggle for
power may result in a reduction in the size of 'the Tanaka
faction, with a splinter group splitting off and forming yet
another faction within" the LDP.
Three clear successors to Nakasone emerge:
Takeshita, previously mentioned, Foreign Minister Shintaro
Abe ("acting" faction chairman of the Fukuda faction), and
Executive Board Chairman and former Foreign Minister Kiichi
Miyazawa ("acting" faction chairman of the Suzuki
faction). 154 Known in Japanese political circles as the "New
Leaders", all three are described as traditional Japanese
politicians: consensus-oriented, and not given to the
outgoing style of Nakasone. 155 Representative Hiroshi
Matsuzuka describes Abe as the most direct and least patient
of the three. Abe has a political science background with
numerous contacts throughout the world resulting from his
extensive diplomatic travels. 156
Miyazawa has experience in economics and foreign
affairs, and is known as a proponent of expansionist
economic policies vice the inclination toward "fiscal
responsibility" favored by Nakasone. Takeshita, by
contrast, has had to pay allegiance to Nakasone 's fiscal
policies, a negative point in light of the growing discon-
tent within the LDP toward Nakasone 's handling of the







Bradley K. Martin offers the following comment
regarding Nakasone's likely successor: "If precedent is
followed, each eventually will have his turn as prime
minister. The main dispute among them boils down to who
should go first." 158 If one accepts the premise that
Miyazawa, Abe, and Takeshita are all likely successors to
Nakasone, what is the implication for future Japanese atti-
tudes toward defense burden-sharing? In all likelihood, it
means business as usual. Japanese political affiliations
determine policy, not the other way around, whether it is
economic, foreign or defense policy. 159 The LDP is not an
ideological party per se, rather it is the machine that runs
Japan. Up until now, continuity has been the trademark of
the office of the prime minister regardless of who is in
power at any given time. The Japanese decision-making
process is one of consensus-opinion: very slow, often inef-
ficient, yet effective in implementation.
Even the conservative Nakasone, considered a strong
supporter of the United States, has been reticent to place
unpopular issues to the test in the Japanese Diet: constitu-
tional reform, anti-espionage laws, recognition of the
Yasukuni Shrine, educational reform 150 - all of these issues
have been effectively side-stepped. Nakasone is fully
cognizant of the very real limitation to his power, as well
as the tenuous nature of his support (more so in light of
Tanaka's slow recovery from his stroke).
It would be foolhardy to suggest that Nakasone's
successor's would be no different in their attitudes toward
U.S. -Japan burden- sharing . If nothing else, Naksone is the
most conservative (from the U.S. perspective) and pro-U.S.
158 Martin, p. 15
159 Smith
'""The Naksone PR Exuberance" Far Eastern Economi c
Review (June 16, 1983), p. 13.
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prime minister the United States has had to deal with in
many years. The lesson here might be that the U.S. must
capitalize on the present and pressure Japan to the greatest
extent possible to accelerate the burden- sharing process
while Nakasone is still in office, rather than wait for a
less enthusiastic successor to arrive, possibly causing the
defense spending gap between our two nations to widen, vice
narrow.
If we look beyond the "New Leaders", we increase the
likelihood of change in Japanese attitudes toward defense
burden- sharing. As Matsuzuka describes it: "There will be
new New Leaders. These will be people who grew up after the
war. Then we'll have more dynamism in politics. 161 The
implications of such new leadership would be difficult to
estimate. In any case, their pressure would not be felt
until at least the mid-1990s at which time a very favorable
(or unfavorable) defense relationship may have involved
between the United States and Japan, depending upon the
course we pursue today . However, for the duration of the
Reagan years and through the following four years we can
expect a very predictable Japanese government, not unlike
the one in power today.
Martin, p. 15.
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VI. AMERICAN DEFENSE OF JAPAN: WHAT DIRECTION FOR THE
FUTURE ?
From the American perspective, It is difficult to under-
stand the reluctance which Japanese have toward doing their
fair share of defending their homeland. When Prime Minister
Suzuki met with President Reagan on May 1981, a joint commu-
nique was issued (with predictably vague sounding language)
committing Japan to improving its defense capabilities. 162
However, upon leaving the United States, Suzuki stumbled
when greeted by Japanese reporters and more or less denied
having agreed to anything at all with President Reagan.
Such actions lead Americans to conclude that the Japanese
are to be measured by what they do, not what they say.
Indeed, even Prime Minister Nakasone; by most measures a
close friend of the United States; has been much bigger on
words than deeds (largely due to constraints imposed upon
the prime minister by the Japanese political system)
.
Martin E. Weinstein, in an article written for the
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies explains these contra-
dictions :
Imperial ambition, power politics and large military
forces are popularly believed to have led Japan down the
road to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Therefore, renounce
imperialist ambition, power politics and offensive mili-
tary forces, concentrate instead on peaceful, economic
pursuits, and the result should be peace. It is
precisely this fundamentally isolationist mentality that
helps to explain how the Japanese can simultaneously
favor the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty, disbelieve the
American guarantee or Japan's defense, and yet reject an
active military role in the alliance. Neither the dwin-
dling of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, nor its partial rede-
floyment to the Indian Ocian, nor the growth of Soviet
orces around Japan, nor Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan has yet had a significant effect on this
deep-seated isolationism - this irrational belief that
1
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most Japanese have that Japan is immune to international
military balances, conflict, and war.
However, Weinstein goes on to say-
as unsatisfactory as Japan's defense and alliance policy
may be to those who see a pressing need to'build a
powerful coalition to deter Soviet adventures or miscal-
culations, it should be kept in mind that even an isola-
tionist Japan that is not bearing its fair share of the
defense burden is clearly preferable for American inter-
ests to a neutral or hostile Japan. It is of crucial
importance not to let our differences on defense and
alliance policy become divisive and destructive. 16 "
Are we to conclude from Weinstein' s analysis that the U.S.
should be resigned to a "third-rate" defense effort from a
"first-rate" ally (not to mention an economic superpower)?
I would contend not, and we must then explore possible
avenues through which the United States might persuade Japan
to hasten its rearmament drive.
It cannot be overemphasized that the present consensus
in Japan for the support of a broader defense role is a very
tenuous one. The 1983 Japanese fiscal budget was the most
austere since 1955, with no increase (overall) from the 1982
budget. 165 However, the defense budget was increased, partly
due to U.S. pressures, and partly due to Japan's new aware-
ness of
.
the global realities in the Pacific Basin and the
world. Realizing the fact that any near-term increases of a
significant amount for defense are unlikely, how might the
U.S. exert pressure upon Japan to "change its tune"?
First, let us examine the SDF in Japan today. Due to an
almost irrational need for civilian control over the mili-
tary, the SDF has its hands tied in many respects
163 Ibid, p. 30.
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operationally. The Japanese Diet has enacted legislation
which in effect prevents the Ground Self Defense Forces from
shooting until they see the "whites of their enemies eyes"
in a literal sense, an absurd concept when one is discussing
the defense of your homeland. 1SS In other words, the SDF
will not respond to the enemy until attacked, and in the
event of an attack will only respond at the same level of
violence and no more." Additionally, SDF numbers do not
"speak" for themselves.
The SDF is dangerously low on ammunition, the air forces
have little fuel to practice with, administrative procedures
are cumbersome and combat training is poor. Japan could
only muster approximately 40,000 reservists on short notice
(as compared to Switzerland, a model neutralist country,
which could mobilize close to 700,000 troops in the same
time frame!). In short, the SDF is not an in-depth fighting
force and it would only be able to withstand an enemy attack
for a very short time without massive U.S. intervention. 167
If this is the case, then before the U.S. can convince
Japan that it is in its interest to- purchase a fleet of 125
P3C - Orion ASW aircraft, it should first ensure that the
current 50 or so ASW aircraft are being maintained and
utilized to the correct limits of their capabilities.
Before the GSDF increases its number of divisions from 12 to
15, it should first ensure that these 12 divisions are fully
capable, well-trained and well- supplied units capable of
fighting a sustained effort.
Both the Carter and Reagan administrations have outlined
specific proposals to the Japanese which would commit the
SDF to certain mission, enabling U.S. forces to be released
lss Taketsugu Tsurutani, "Japan' s Security, Defense




for operations elsewhere if the need arose. The Reagan
administration has called for three basic missions to be
filled by Japan. First, the sea-lane defense of Japan out
to 1,000 miles. Second, the mining and blockading of the
strategic Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya Straits which connects
the Sea of Japan with the Pacific Ocean, thereby inter-
cepting Soviet naval and merchant vessels prior to reaching
open ocean. Third, the development of an air defense
network which could effectively stop and destroy Soviet
fighter and long-range aircraft. 158
All of the Reagan proposals are credible, yet they are
easier to agree to than to implement. Even under the
Nakasone government, defense improvements have been moderate
in nature. Japan cannot be solely blamed for this. The
United States has made it clear through its actions that it
is as committed to Japanese defense as ever. Why should the
Japanese, given the past success of the Yoshida strategy,
pump billions of yen into defense when they know that the
U.S. will come running to fill the defense gap whenever
Japan fails to meet its end of the security agreement?
In retrospect, the Carter administration's "swing
strategy" was alarming to the Japanese, and it may have
stimulated a positive response from the U.S. perspective.
Reagan, although not abandoning the swing strategy concept,
has been emphasizing missions for the SDF to fulfill. This
"mission strategy" sounds reasonable, but is very slow in
achieving the desired affect: increased Japanese burden-
sharing. Let us examine possible U.S. tactics further.
Up until now, every U.S. -Japan defense summit has
resulted in a vague, bland document; endorsed by both
parties, committing Japan to greater defense responsibili-
1
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ties, no strings attached . While accomplishing little, it
enables the U.S. president to declare that he "successfully
persuaded the Japanese to do more", thereby satisfying the
American electorate. The Japanese on the other hand go home
knowing that no real commitment has been agreed upon, saving
the leadership from domestic pressures. In this light, the
comprehensive security concept is little more than a
rationale for doing nothing. The growing Soviet threat can
no longer be ignored; even by Japan. If they ignore it
anyway, a time may be reached where the Japanese will have
to accept the "Finlandization" of their country.
The U.S. proposals for increased Japanese burden- sharing
are realistic, necessary, but lack the proper incentives for
implementation. The Reagan administration must fall back
and regroup in its thinking on how to handle this Japanese
defense dilemma. Avoiding nebulous commitments with no
framework for implementation, the administration must enter
serious negotiations with the aim of committing Japan to
very specific goals, including a commitment to expand on the
hardware and personnel required to meet these goals, with an
eye on target figures.
Concerning the one percent GNP defense limit , the
Japanese will have to abandon this figure or the U.S. may as
well forget getting the Japanese to meet the specific
agreed-upon goals. In light of the current administration's
proposals, Larry Niksch calculates that it would require "A
sustained growth in the defense budget of 10 or 11 percent
annually would appear necessary. Otherwise, logistics
likely will suffer, even if the planned targets are
attained". 159 Barring unrealistic economic growth, even for
the Japanese, this spending will be impossible unless the
one percent ceiling is broken. Considering the recommended
1G9 Ibid, p. 35.
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levels of weapons which Washington calculates Japan will
need to realistically fulfill the agreed-upon missions,
Japan will likely have to boost its defense spending to
about two percent of GNP (if one also calculates the commen-
surate increase in logistical support which will be required
to maintain such a defense effort.) 170
It should be emphasized, however that this author in no
way would recommend committing Japan to a new two percent
GNP defense spending level, for this could backfire in the
future when a huge sacrifice may be needed from Japan in
response to a developing emergency; that would not be the
time to be engaged in a debate over how to get Japan to bust
its two percent GNP spending limit! On the contrary, what
is needed is a commitment to spend whatever is necessary in
order to fulfill an agreed upon strategic objective, GNP
percentages aside. At present, however, this will require
Japan to exceed its one percent spending limit . This should
be treated as an internal question for Japan to resolve; not
something which the U.S. should get caught up in which
detracts from the real goal: equitable Japan-U.S. burden-
sharing .
The Japanese have a great industrial sector aimed at
high technology. Therefore they would be well-suited in
areas requiring a high-tech capability; i.e. air defense,
anti-submarine warfare, etc. Japan should be encouraged to
"specialize" in these areas to exploit an inherant strength.
Likewise, the private defense sector in Japan would rise in
political influence as it expanded, enabling the U.S. to
"pull" a more influential lever in the LDP. Interest groups
are the bulwark of the Japanese political system and the
U.S. would find its efforts to effect change in Japan made
much easier if contacts were established with these key
Ibid.
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interest groups. Having concentrated primarily on the
current administration's policies, let us briefly explore
alternative U.S. views with the purpose of looking beyond
1988.
1. Beyond the Reagan Administration
Much of this discussion has focused on the prospects
for increased Japanese defense burden- sharing on the basis
of how the current administration has dealt with this issue.
Recommendations and responses to the U.S. position have been
mainly in consideration of the Reagan administration's rela-
tions with Japan, not with what will follow Ronald Reagan's
presidency
.
If one looks beyond 1988 , we can see several
possible alternatives. On the Republican side, Vice
President George Bush would likely gain the nomination,
given historical precedent. If one accepts this premise,
Bush would likely defeat any opponent if the economy is
running along smoothly. If the country is in a recession,
Bush would likely lose, as Americans would not find
Candidate Bush to have the same charisma of Ronald Reagan
(although Bush would undoubtedly have Reagan's unqualified
support )
.
Vice President Bush is certainly not the conserva-
tive ideologue that Reagan is (recall Bush accusing Reagan
of preaching "voodoo economics" during the 1980 presidential
campaign) , but he has demonstrated his loyalty as a strong
team player. Bush has had extensive governmental service in
Washington, with a considerable educational background.
This could lead to a greater sophistication in handling
Japan; however, a Bush presidency would likely be marked
more by continuity with his predecessor than change. The
emphasis on a mission-oriented approach to Japan would
likely continue as a matter of policy. If a Republican
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"ideologue", i.e. Congressman Jack Kemp, were to become
president instead of Bush, this could result in a new Japan
policy, however the political chances would seem slim, given
historical precedent.
On the Democratic side, it is difficult to speculate
with any accuracy on the likely 1988 candididate, but
current names in the news include veteran Senators Gary
Hart, John Glenn and Edward M. Kennedy. Just as the
Republicans tend to draw from conservative "think tanks" for
advice and expertise in formulating policy (such as the
Hoover Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, or
the Heritage Foundation) , the same can be said for the
Democrats, who would draw upon moderate and liberal "think
tanks" for advice (i.e., the Center for Defense Information
or the Brookings Institution). Accordingly, let us explore
several different U.S. views on Japan as counter-points to
the Reagan administration's views.
On the left, an article by David C. Morrison is
illustative of U.S. liberal thinking on the issue of
U.S. -Japan defense burden- sharing .
-
1 7 x Clearly, Morrison
believes that Japan has already gone too far in the area of
military spending. He cites Nakasone's election as prime
minister as an indicator of a dangerous shift in Japan to
the right. Morrison contends such a shift will lead Japan
to pursue the same dangerous ant i- Soviet tendency already
found in the United States, leading to an unacceptable
heightening of tensions between East and West. Japan has
been a model pacifist nation for over thirty years; a preoc-
cupation with rearmament could disrupt this pacifist
tendency, even leading to a rise in militarism. 172
171 David C. Morrison, "Rearm or Else" Inquiry (February
1983): pp. 22-25. ' i
172 Ibid, p. 24.
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In general, Morrison views current trends in Japan
as being unwelcome throughout the world, unnecessary for the
security of the United States, and unpopular in Japan. If a
left-wing candidate within the Democratic party adhering to
these views were elected in 1988, it would signify a radical
change in the course of U.S. policy in the Pacific, espe-
cially with regard to the issue of burden- sharing.
What sort of policy recommendations would liberals
tend to offer? Basically, a retreat from the current estab-
lished forward basing policy to a more isolationist defense
posture. U.S. diplomatic efforts would be initiated to:
encourage greater regional military cooperation and
self-reliance, without the current overwhelming U.S.
military presence. The United States could then refocus
its attention on the long-neglected political and
economic components of regional security.
An article by the senior ranking Democrat in the
Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee for East Asia and
Pacific Affairs, John Glenn, illustrates a moderate alterna-
tive to the Reagan administration. : 7 * Senator Glenn contends
that the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty is the "linchpin, not
only of Japanese defense, but of U.S. military activities
throughout Asia". 175 In this respect Glenn would be in
agreement with the Reagan administration's views on the
importance of current defense arrangements with Japan.
However, in terms of urging Japan to increase its share of
defense spending, he believes Japan has already made
"substantial defense contributions at a time when NATO and
U.S. defense spending remained essentially static." 176
17 3 Ibid
17
"John Glenn, "Defending the New Japan" Washington
Quarterly (Winter 1982): pp. 25-31.
175 Ibid, p. 26.
17S Ibid, In this area more than any other statistics are
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It should be mentioned that Senator Glenn welcomes
increased involvement by Japan in regional security matters,
however the sense of urgency found in the Reagan administra-
tion is not present with this moderate viewpoint. Glenn
criticizes the current administation' s efforts as being
excessively bilateral in orientation. Glenn would prefer to
see a multilateral arrangement in the Pacific, along the
line of a Pacific community of nations. This would serve as
a forum for the exchange of ideas, hopefully integrating
economic and military cooperation in the Pacific to effect
"consensus-building" as a means of enhancing Pacific Basin
security
.
This moderate approach would be welcome within
Japan, especially after the rather conservative Nakasone
leaves office. I would anticipate less radical change of
policy toward Japan if a moderate were to replace Reagan,
Democrat or Republican. The likely difference between a
moderate administration and the more conservative Reagan
administration would be more in terms of pursuing the proper
avenue to effect military cooperation with Japan, as opposed
to the question of whether continued military cooperation
would be advisable in the case of the liberals. President
Carter's Under Secretrary of Defense for Policy (1979-81)
Robert W. Komer essentially echoes this when he said:
Amen that the US can no longer (given the relative
decline in our economic strength vis-a-vis that of our
allies) provide most of the Free World s strategic and
theatre nuclear umbrella, command the seas, be the chief
arsenal of democracy (and of several friendly dictator-
ships too), and still provide more well-equipped conven-
tional forces to almost any theatre than any other
_o pre
.
point to the consistent less- than-one- percent GNP spent by
Japan, liberals point to the total defense outlays by Japan
purely in terms or dollars spent or in percent growth over a
certain period of time. Which is more or less impressive?
Both groups use the same figures to come up with the oppo-
site conclusions: either the miserliness of Japanese defense
expenditures or the abundance of it!
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Thus far, the author has presented liberal and
moderate viewpoints to demonstrate the differences one might
find with a new administration in 1988. Of the two view-
points, the moderate position would be far more palatable to
planners in the current administration. If we turn to U.S.
conservatives, we can* still find alternatives to the poli-
cies of the Reagan administration, despite its conservative
leanings. In an article for Comparative Strategy William M.
Carpenter and Stephen P. Gilbert offer such an alternative:
the United States might consider other actions designed
to persuade Japan to improve its defenseive capability.
Such possibilities include trade sanctions, removing
American troops from Okinawa and Japan, and insisting
upon revision of the Mutual Security Treaty.... if neces-
sary, such actions should be undertaken. The United
States should be interested in a fair and truly mutual
defensive alliance; non-reciprocal troop stationing
accords no longer advance American purposes. 178
It must be mentioned that there are an abundance of
views within my three categories of- liberal, moderate and
conservative; no discussion here is meant to be all-
encompassing in nature. 179
177 Robert W. Komer, "The Trick is how to get it" Armed
Forces Journal International (October 1981): p. 72.
178 William M. Carpenter and Stephen J. Gilbert,
"Japanese Views on Defense Burden- Sharing" Comparative
Strategy 3(1982): p. 278. —
179 For an excellent compilation of a wide variety of
views on the U.S. -Japan alliance from both U.S. and Japanese
scholars, politicians, businessmen, miltary officers, etc.,
see Robert W. Barnett Beyond war : Japan ' s Concept of
Comprehensive National Security (Washington, LJ.C:
Pergamon-Brassey ' s , 1984)
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2 . Conclusions
To conclude, my proposals are supportive of the
present administration's Japan policies to a large extent.
However, if the current pace of Japanese rearmament is too
slow for U.S. planners (and I would contend that it is),
then administration efforts in this area should be redou-
bled. Professor Edward A. Olsen, Associate Professor of
National Security Affairs and Coordinator of Asian Studies
at the Naval PostGraduate School, reminds us of the conse-
quences of not pursuing plans for increased Japanese defense
burden - sharing with the utmost zeal:
Tokyo is masterful at using tactics designed to postpone
distasteful and costly defense decisions long enough
that the United States becomes frustrated, or distracted
by other concerns. and lets Japan slip away with a
minimal response.
Olsen suggests that a renegotiation of the 1960 Mutual
Security Treaty on more equitable terms would be the most
effective method for meeting the administration's goals for
Japan. 181 Considering the slow but steady growth in the
Japanese defense forces in the past few years, Olsen'
s
strategy may be far too risky as a tactic for the present.
If such a proposal caused Japan to adopt a neutral or
pro-Soviet stance (however unlikely), the risks would
outweigh the potential advantages. Olsen' s strategy may be
most useful as a warning to the Japanese that the United
States is quickly tiring of the status quo, and unless they
begin to seriously address the administration's proposals, a
very undesirable arrangement, from the Japanese perspective,
may result.
1
"Edward A. Olsen, U.S. - Japan Strategic Reciprocity :
A Neo-Internationalist View (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, 1985), p. 114.
181 Ibid, pp. 114 - 154.
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Considering the growing domestic unrest stemming
from the huge trade imbalance which the United States is
experiencing vis-a-vis Japan, the Japanese would be well
advised to negotiate in faith or a trade war could arise
which would drive a wedge between our two nations and make
burden- sharing a moot question. Japanese exports rely on
the U.S. market for success, and it is in this area which
the administration would have the greatest opportunity to
obtain realistic defense commitments from Japan, and this
would be my recommendation. Otherwise, the Olsen strategy
may have to be employed, and that would be risky indeed.
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